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This dissertation addresses a number of questions which relate to a growing body of
evidence for the rise of markups among large firms, and concentration in many industries, in
the United States over time. Although existing evidence suggests that markups have been on
the rise, there are a number of competing explanations for these trends which have differing
policy implications. In this dissertation I argue that, in the retail food industry, the most
likely cause of rising markups over time is the growing prevalence of “niche” goods which
more closely match consumers’ idiosyncratic needs, and estimate a number of structural
models of consumer demand in order to study the evidence for this hypothesis.
The first chapter discusses the existing evidence that markups have been on the
rise in the United States and introduces the theoretical framework and empirical evidence
motivating the study of markups in the retail food industry. In this chapter I show that the
number of goods carried by retail food stores in my data has grown significantly between
2006 and 2017, and that the characteristics of the offered goods have changed over time.
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Using a simple theoretical model, I argue that firms’ incentives to offer “niche” goods, which
I define herein, grow as they become able to stock a larger portfolio of goods. I also introduce
the data set which is used in all three chapters of this dissertation and briefly discuss the
way in which I select the categories which are the focus of my empirical work in Chapters 2
and 3.
The second chapter introduces three empirical models of consumer choice in nine retail
food categories. The first is a traditional mixed logit model in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995), which has been applied in many studies in industrial organization. The
second is an approximation of this model, developed by Salanié and Wolak (2019), which
allows consumer preferences to differ flexibly in every three-digit ZIP code in my data. The
third model is a constant elasticity model of demand, which makes different assumptions
than do mixed logit models and serves in part as a robustness check against their potentially
strong assumptions. I estimate each of these models separately in nine large categories of
products in 2006 and 2017 and demonstrate that each model implies that consumers have
become significantly less price sensitive over time. A simple pricing rule demonstrates that
the firms in my data may have been able to sustain larger markups over time solely due
to the observed changes in the price sensitivity of consumers, absent any changes in firm
pricing behavior.
In the third and final chapter, I estimate two additional models of demand in order
to determine the structural reasons that consumers have become less price sensitive. First, I
demonstrate that an assumption restricting changes in unobserved product quality over time
allows us to distinguish between the effects of rising horizontal differentiation and changes
in the direct disutility of price due to, for example, changing consumer demographics and
vii
wealth. In a second model, I introduce a new scaling parameter which allows me to measure
differences in consumers’ price sensitivity for newer and older goods (as measured by how
long a good has been sold in a store in my sample) separately. Together, these models
provide evidence that horizontal differentiation has increased significantly over time and
that consumers are particularly insensitive to changes in the prices of newer goods. I take
these findings as evidence that niche products do play a significant role in explaining the





List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
Chapter 1. Rising Variety in Retail Stores 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Simple Model of Optimal Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Monopolist’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 Differentiation as Stocking Costs Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.1 Weekly Scanner Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.2 Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.3 Selecting Product Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Motivating Empirical Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 2. Measuring Differentiation and Markups Over Time 26
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Structural Model of Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 BLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 FRAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.3 Constant Elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.4 Price Endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
ix
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Demand Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1.1 BLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1.2 FRAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.1.3 Constant Elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 Implied Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.2.1 BLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.2.2 FRAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.2.3 Constant Elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5 Extensions and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5.1 Panel of Yogurt Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5.2 Additional Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5.3 Sales Targeting Behavior Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Chapter 3. Decomposing Changes in Consumer Substitution Patterns 70
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Testing Model Predictions Against Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.1 Nicheness vs. Price Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.2 Are New Products More Niche? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.3 Vertical Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendices 85
Appendix A. Selecting Product Categories 86
Appendix B. Omitted Figures and Tables 89
x
List of Tables
1.1 Modules Without Evidence of Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 Share Weighted Price and Outside Option Size, by Module and Year . . . . 22
2.1 Own-Price Elasticities and Implied Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Median Price Elasticities and Implied Markups, by Year and Module . . . . 45
2.3 Correlation Between FRAC Estimates Across Modules, 2006 and 2017 . . . 49
3.1 Distribution of Estimated and Counterfactual Own-Price Elasticities . . . . 77
3.2 Estimates of Scaling Parameter for Newer Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
A.1 Results of All Tests for Inventory Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
B.1 Changing Brand Structure and Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
B.2 Estimated Price Elasticities by Year, Constant Elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . 89
B.3 Estimates of Scaling Parameter with Log-Normal Preferences . . . . . . . . . 98
xi
List of Figures
1.1 First Order Statistic of Willingness to Pay by J , σ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Number of Additional Products in Sample Modules in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Characteristics of New Products, USDA ERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Coefficients of Variation of Prices Within Module, 2006 and 2017 . . . . . . 23
2.1 Distributions of Estimated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities (BLP) . . . . 43
2.2 Distribution of Estimates of ZIP Code-Level Price Coefficients . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Distributions of Estimated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities (FRAC) . . . 50
2.4 Distributions of Price Elasticities (Constant Elasticity) . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Interquartile Distribution of All Implied Markups (BLP) . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Quantile-Quantile Comparisons of Markups in 2006 and 2017 (BLP), by Module 56
2.7 Interquartile Range of Markups (FRAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8 Quantile-Quantile Comparisons of Markups in 2006 and 2017 (FRAC), by
Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.9 Distributions of All Optimal Markups (Constant Elasticity) . . . . . . . . . 60
2.10 Utility Coefficients on Price Over Time, Refrigerated Yogurt . . . . . . . . . 62
2.11 Own Price Elasticity Distribution by Year, Refrigerated Yogurt . . . . . . . 63
2.12 Store-Level Utility Coefficients Over Time, Refrigerated Yogurt . . . . . . . 64
2.13 Own-Price Elasticity Distribution, Additional Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.14 Google Trends Results for Selected Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Distributions of Estimated and Counterfactual Own-Price Elasticities . . . . 76
3.2 Counterfactual Changes in Price Elasticities without Preference Heterogeneity 78
3.3 Distributions of Quality of New and Existing Products, by Module . . . . . . 82
B.1 Own-Price Elasticity Distribution, Nested Logit, Light Beer . . . . . . . . . 90
B.2 Average Cross-Price Elasticity Distribution, Nested Logit, Light Beer . . . . 91
B.3 Distributions of the Number of Products Sold, by Module . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.4 Distributions of Mean Own-Price Elasticities by UPC, BLP . . . . . . . . . . 93
xii
B.5 Distributions of Optimal Markups by Module, BLP Estimates . . . . . . . . 94
B.6 Distributions of Mean Own-Price Elasticities by UPC, FRAC . . . . . . . . 95
B.7 Distributions of the Store-Level Price Elasticities, by Module . . . . . . . . . 96
B.8 Effects of Increasing Preference Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
xiii
Chapter 1
Rising Variety in Retail Stores
1.1 Introduction
Retail supply chains have become substantially more advanced over recent decades.
As large firms have invested in information technology (Shin and Eksioglu, 2014; Soliman
et al., 2005) and have developed more agile vertically integrated distribution networks (Kuhn
and Sternbeck, 2013), they have been able to more efficiently keep track of and move inven-
tory between wholesalers, distribution centers, and stores. As a result, stores are now able to
sell a much wider variety of products than in the past (Fernie, Sparks and McKinnon, 2010;
Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2015; Consumer Reports, 2014). These trends have provided retail
consumers with far more choices, thereby increasing the likelihood that a given consumer
will find a product which closely fits their preferences (Baumol and Ide, 1956). Recent work
by Neiman and Vavra (2019) detailing the rising concentration of household purchases over
time is quite consistent with this intuition.
In this chapter I discuss the ramifications of these facts from an industrial organiza-
tion (IO) perspective, in order to understand the ways in which product selection, prices,
and markups in retail food stores may have changed as a result of advances in supply chain
management. Traditional empirical IO models imply that firms prefer to offer products
which are maximally differentiated from each other, as measured by own- and cross-price
1
derivatives of demand, as this increases sustainable markups. Moreover, as I demonstrate
in a simple discrete choice model, as the number of products sold in a store increases, firms
have an incentive to offer products for which consumers have increasingly heterogeneous
preferences, i.e. more “niche” products. Given a large enough menu of products offered,
niche products offer the monopolist the opportunity to better match each consumer’s tastes,
thereby permitting the firm to charge higher prices. The rise of agile and flexible supply
chains seems to offer a natural opportunity for firms to have made progress tailoring their
product offerings. Supply chains have become more demand focused (e.g. the “quick re-
sponse” regime), meaning firms receive regular information about the real-time demand for
each product. This provides the opportunity to better select the assortment of products
offered in order to maximize profits. Accordingly, the focus of this chapter is to combine
theoretical evidence demonstrating firms’ incentives to modify their portfolios of products
over time with empirical evidence suggesting that firms have done so.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 I briefly discuss the
literature most closely related to this chapter and this dissertation, including a discussion of
existing evidence for rising markups and the rising consumption of niche goods. In Section
1.3, I introduce a simple model of portfolio choice for a monopolist and demonstrate the
ways in which a firm’s incentives to offer what I call “niche” goods grow as they are able to
offer a wider selection of goods. I discuss the data used in this chapter as well as Chapters
2 and 3 in Section 1.4, and discuss some suggestive patterns in that data in Section 1.5. I
end the chapter with concluding remarks in Section 1.6.
2
1.2 Related Literature
This dissertation is closely related to the recent literature suggesting that the vari-
able profits of the largest firms in the United States have been rising since the 1980s (Barkai,
2020; De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger, 2020). Much of this work takes what is called the
“production approach” in order to estimate markups from data on firm revenue and costs.
In this approach, which was developed and popularized by Hall (1988) and De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012), researchers estimate firms’ production functions and utilize first order
conditions for cost minimization in order to map these estimates into estimates of markups.
This approach, while quite appealing for its simplicity, has faced substantial criticism re-
cently. In particular, Brand (2019) argues that some of the assumptions of this method are
inconsistent with imperfect competition, and Bond et al. (2020) demonstrate practical issues
with using revenue and cost data to estimate production functions.
Another limitation of this approach is that, because it does not require a model of
pricing, demand, or competition, it offers limited options for researchers interested in under-
standing the causes of rising markups. Existing explanations for the underlying causes have
been varied, ranging from rising concentration (Autor et al., 2020), to increasing monopsony
power (Stansbury and Summers, 2020). Naturally, the dominant mechanisms may be com-
plicated and will likely vary by industry. For example, as outlined by Ganapati (2021), while
concentration has increased in a number of sectors in recent decades, prices have declined
and output has increased in these sectors over the same period, both of which are counter
to standard concerns about rising market power or collusion. Given these competing expla-
nations, it is important to study markups in ways which can at least partially differentiate
between potential alternative mechanisms.
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One alternative to the production approach, and the one which is taken in Chapter
2, relies on estimates of consumer demand and an alternative set of first-order conditions
to estimate markups. There is an extensive literature in industrial organization which has
developed a sophisticated set of tools for demand estimation (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,
1995; Nevo, 2001). These tools are able to approximate flexible substitution patterns, and
data sets containing prices and sales are more readily available than those containing details
of firms’ input choices and production, especially outside of manufacturing industries. One
example of this approach is Grieco, Murry and Yurukoglu (2020), who estimate markups
in the the United States automobile industry using this method and find that costs have
risen as a result of cars growing larger, heavier, and more durable. Their use of the demand
approach in order to estimate markups is central to their ability to distinguish between this
story and one in which costs have been constant over time as prices have risen.
The closest existing paper to this dissertation is Neiman and Vavra (2019), who
document the fact that household purchases have become more concentrated at the same
time that store-level sales have become less concentrated.1 They attribute these facts to firms
offering more products, which allows consumers to find goods which are closely tailored to
their tastes. Their model aggregates nicely and permits a discussion which covers many more
products than are considered herein. However, this comes at the cost of doing the analysis
at the product category level rather than at the store or product level, which aggregates
over a substantial amount of variation, and abstracts from some of the heterogeneity which
can be incorporated in studies of fewer products like the present work. This dissertation
1Kiedaisch, Chai and Rohde (2018) also study changing consumption patterns and variety, and argue for
the importance of including consumer-level preference heterogeneity in studies of the benefits of variety.
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compliments their work by focusing on a smaller number of products (and paying a much
higher computational cost in subsequent chapters), which allows me to describe the full
distribution of price elasticities at thousands of stores and discuss in more detail the ways
in which consumer preferences have changed over time.
1.3 Simple Model of Optimal Differentiation
To set the stage for the remainder of this dissertation, in this section I discuss the likely
effects of a firm developing a supply chain which is increasingly demand driven and which
requires significantly less inventory to be stored, as has been the case for many firms in recent
decades. I model these features of the supply chain as an opportunity for firms to (i) keep
track of and better respond to key features of demand and (ii) sell more products/varieties
in total, and provide intuition which indicates that these new and improved supply chains
may have made stores more likely to sell products which are increasingly differentiated and
niche, in a sense I define below.
1.3.1 Monopolist’s Problem
Consider a monopolist choosing a menu of products to offer from some large set. The
firm knows that, after choosing which portfolio of products to stock, it will set prices in
order to maximize short-run profits. The less willing consumers are to substitute between
products or to purchasing nothing, the more surplus the monopolist can extract from con-
sumers in the form of high prices. Knowing this, the firm would like to stock products which
are “differentiated” in exactly this sense. This point is related to a now significant litera-
ture studying firms’ endogenous choices of products, and product characteristics, to offer to
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consumers (Waldfogel, 2003; Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim, 2009; Fan, 2013; Sullivan, 2017).
We can see this intuition somewhat more precisely in, for example, a short run profit
maximizing monopolist’s first order condition in the form of price derivatives of demand.
Toward this end, in Equations 1.1 and 1.2 I present first order conditions for single and
multi-product monopolists, respectively. In each equation, p∗ represents the (vector) of
optimal prices, mc denotes marginal costs, and s(p∗) is the realized demand.




s(p∗) (single product) (1.1)
p∗ −mc = −J−1p (p∗)s(p∗) (multi-product) (1.2)
The term Jp(p




, making J−1p (p
∗) analogous to ( ds
dp∗
)−1 in Equation 1.1. According to these first
order conditions, monopolists will be able to charge higher prices (and earn larger margins)
by offering products for which consumers are less price sensitive, as measured by price
derivatives of demand.2
Following this logic, the more differentiated are the offered products, the more the
monopolist can (i) set high prices on many goods without losing customers and (ii) price
discriminate across consumers, ensuring that each consumer purchases a product with a large
margin for the monopolist.3 The firm can achieve its goals by offering goods differing on either
vertical (e.g. quality) or horizontal (e.g. niche product characteristics) dimensions but the
2Of course, the derivatives of demand which appear in these equations are functions, so defining “less
price sensitive” precisely would require some additional notation.
3Note that the off-diagonal elements of J−1p are important largely because, to the extent that marginal
costs differ across products, minimal cross-product substitution means that the monopolist can charge higher
markups on goods with lower marginal costs.
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end result is the same. This brings us to the first prediction of the chapter. Given the growing
emphasis of retail supply chains on quick responses to real-time consumer demand, the
increased efficiency of these supply chains, and the resulting rise in the number of products
on store shelves, it seems natural to suspect that firms have had an increasing number of
opportunities, and an increasing technological ability, to change the assortment of products
they offer in order to increase differentiation and thereby increase markups.
1.3.2 Differentiation as Stocking Costs Decline
Another important effect of improved supply chain efficiency is that stores are no
longer constrained to keep large inventories of products within a store (Sparks, 2010). In-
stead, products are often kept at chain-owned distribution centers and delivered to stores in
smaller frequent trips as inventories run low. This means that the effective costs of stocking
additional products in a store have declined, as the firm need not have significant inventory
space within the store in order to offer a new good. Naturally, this changes the nature of a
monopolist’s problem, in that it can now offer a wider selection of products. This raises the
question: how will the attributes of newer products (those added due to reduced stocking
costs) differ from those offered before these technological improvements?
Both horizontal and vertical differentiation may be beneficial to the firm, as both
imply that consumers will be willing to pay at higher prices. In a sense, firms always wish
to offer high quality goods. A sufficiently high quality good can induce all consumers to
purchase at some price (which naturally depends on the strength of preferences for quality).
Normally, however, we think of vertical differentiation as being costly. In empirical studies of
manufacturing productivity, for instance, higher quality goods are assumed to require higher
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quality inputs (De Loecker et al., 2016). This may constrain the extent to which firms can
increase vertical differentiation even as stocking costs decline, because wholesale costs for
high quality goods will remain high.
To the contrary, introducing a new horizontal attribute like new flavors, or changing
product branding, may entail a much smaller cost. An important question then, is whether
firms always prefer to offer maximally horizontally differentiated goods, or if the optimal
level of horizontal differentiation differs with the number of products offered. To study this
question, consider a setting in which the utility a consumer i receives from purchasing a
good j at price pj is represented by
uij = −pj + εij
For simplicity, let εij be independent across goods for each consumer.
4 A consumer chooses
to purchase one of J inside options or one outside option with ui0 = 0 by choosing the
option which maximizes her utility. In this form, εij is each consumer’s willingness to pay
for product j. Now suppose a monopolist can only afford to stock a single product (e.g.
because doing so requires maintaining a large in-store inventory). In choosing the type of
product it will sell, the monopolist must choose among two options:
Staple : εij = 1.5 for all i
Niche : εij = 1 or 2, each with probability 0.5
In words, all consumers will pay 1.5 for any Staple good, while for Niche goods half of all
consumers will pay 2 while half will only pay 1. For each consumer, εij is independent across
4This is much stronger than necessary. As long as εij are not perfectly correlated, adding more niche
products becomes more desirable as J increases.
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goods, meaning a consumer’s willingness to pay for one Niche good does not predict their
preferences for another.5
I call these “types” of products to emphasize that there are many of each type to
choose from. Staple goods are meant to represent goods which many consumers are willing
to purchase but for which no consumers are perfectly matched. One may think of goods like
Coca-Cola and Pepsi, which are ubiquitous in grocery stores and which are sold to a large
fraction of soda buyers. Niche goods represent goods which are more narrowly tailored to
a subset of consumers’ tastes. Keeping to sodas as an example, this might include things
like Orange Vanilla Coke Zero. For many consumers, any of “Orange,” “Vanilla,” or “Zero”
might make the product undesirable, but for some consumers these descriptors will make
the product a better fit to their tastes. These consumers will be willing to pay more for the
Niche good, and thus will be less likely to substitute to other products when the price of
the Niche good increases (e.g. above the Staple good price). In this example, the firm will
choose to offer a Staple product, as it can set a price of 1.5 and sell to all consumers, whereas
a Niche product can only be sold to all consumers at a price of 1 or half of consumers at a
price of 2.
In this model, this decision changes as stocking costs decline (i.e. as the number of
products offered increases). If the monopolist can afford to stock two products instead of
one, then it can either again sell to all consumers at p = 1.5 (by offering Staples), it can
sell to 75% of consumers at a price of 2 (by offering Niche products), or it can offer one
of each type of product and sell to 50% of consumers at a price of 2 and the remaining
5The intuition here holds much more generally, as long as εij are not perfectly correlated across goods.
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50% at a price of 1.5. The latter option maximizes profits, meaning the second product the
monopolist stocks will be Niche. In this example, in fact, all products stocked beyond the
first will be Niche. As stocking costs decline, then, two predictions follow: a larger share of
products stocked will be Niche, and average prices will increase.6
This example demonstrates a much broader point. Note that, because the mean
of εij is 1.5 for both types of goods, the moment of the preference distribution which is
most relevant to the firm in this setting is the first order statistic of the distribution of
consumers’ willingness to pay. As the firm offers more options, the likelihood that each
consumer finds a good for which they are willing to pay a significant amount increases. The
larger the variance of preferences for the offered goods, the more stark is this pattern. To
demonstrate this graphically, I consider a monopolist offering two products which are either
both Niche or both Staple goods. Relaxing the definition of a Staple good somewhat, now
let εij ∼ N(1, 0.2) for Staple goods and εij ∼ N(1, 0.6) for Niche goods. In Figure 1.1(a) I
present the distribution of the first order statistic of ε (i.e. the distribution of consumers’
maximum willingness to pay) for Staple (black) and Niche (red, dashed) goods. In this
case, with only two products in stock, the firm faces a trade-off between the two types of
products at many prices. Offering all Niche goods reduces the number of consumers willing
to purchase some good at a price of 1.5 from nearly 100% to something closer to 50-60%.
However, it also raises the average willingness to pay among consumers who do fall above this
threshold. Thus, for small J , larger preference heterogeneity (Niche goods) is only desirable
6In this example, the monopolist never drops its single Staple good. This is because, for any monopolist
with at least 2 products, offering at least one Staple good ensures that every consumer pays at least their
willingness to pay for the Staple (i.e. all consumers purchase a good). Permitting a small number of
consumers to dislike the Staple good solves this issue at the cost of making the example less clear.
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for the firm if the latter outweighs the former.
In Figure 1.1(b), on the other hand, the costs of Niche goods are much smaller. In
this figure I let the monopolist offer 20 products (again, all Niche or all Staple), meaning
that consumers have 20 opportunities to find a product which suits their preferences. In
selling Niche goods, the firm now sacrifices very little in terms of the share of consumers
willing to pay most prices but gains significantly from much higher willingnesses to pay
among consumers in the right tail of the distribution. By offering many goods, the firm has
ensured that most consumers are willing to pay at least 1.5 for a good and many more than
2.5. In contrast to Figure 1.1(a), this represents a significant increase in sustainable prices
and profits. This makes clear that, all else equal, firms switch from preferring to sell Staples
(little preference heterogeneity) to preferring Niche goods (large preference heterogeneity)
as they are able to stock more products.
Figure 1.1: First Order Statistic of Willingness to Pay by J , σ
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
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(a) J = 2 (b) J = 20
Note: First order statistics for J draws from normal distributions with σ = 0.2 (black) and σ = 0.6 (red).
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To summarize, the discussion in this section raises four predictions which we can take
to the data. First, we should expect that the rising number of products firms offer will be
associated with weakly increasing differentiation, as firms have changed the assortment of
goods they stock in response to observed demand patterns. Second, we should predict that
markups have increased in response to rising differentiation, as this is the central reason firms
prefer highly differentiated goods. Third, we should expect that the variance of preferences
for goods has grown on average since 2006, and that this mechanism plays a significant role
in the rise of differentiation. Finally, within 2017, we should expect to find that products
which were more recently introduced are more niche than products which have been around
longer, as measured by the variance of preferences for those products. These predictions are
each at least partially measurable/testable, and doing so will be the focus of much of this
chapter as well as Chapter 3.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Weekly Scanner Data
The first dataset I use comes from the Nielsen Corporation through an agreement
with the Kilts Center at the University of Chicago.7 This dataset contains product-level
sales and average price data from 2006 to 2017 on thousands of stores and dozens of retail
chains which span the United States.8 These data are reported weekly and are exhaustive of
7Researcher(s) own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from The Nielsen Company
(US), LLC and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing
Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen
data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had
no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
8Use of this data set and the scanner data below have become very common within economics. For a
more detailed description of these data, see Hitsch, Hortacsu and Lin (2019).
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all products sold. To make it into my working data set for a given product category, a store
must be a “food store” or “mass merchandiser” and must appear in the Nielsen data selling
at least one good in that category in the first 16 weeks of both 2006 and 2017. Focusing on
food stores and mass merchandisers is natural, as these stores tend to be larger than other
(i.e. drug and convenience) stores in the Nielsen data, and thus better represent the rise in
variety being studied.
As for the second restriction, there have been a number of recent papers discussing
changes in retail concentration and the entry of new, higher-productivity retail stores, which
are not the focus of this dissertation (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan, 2006; Rossi-Hansberg,
Sarte and Trachter, 2018; Smith and Dı́az, 2020). By focusing on a balanced panel of stores
for each category, we reduce the likelihood that these mechanisms explain the results herein.9
Among these stores, I deflate all prices to 2017 dollars using the CPI.10 I restrict all of my
analysis to the first 16 weeks of the year, and to the 300 most popular goods (by the total
number of purchases in the year across all stores in my sample) in each product module
each year, largely as a solution to computational issues.11 In this dissertation, I specify a
product as a unique Universal Product Code (UPC), which is the finest level at which the
Nielsen data differentiates products within a year.12 I present some summary statistics of
9For example, if a large chain in the scanner data had expanded its geographic presence substantially
since 2006 and had also reduced prices substantially, this could reduce estimated price elasticities in the
aggregate.
10Note that, because we are most interested in price elasticities, using the wrong inflation measure (or, in
fact, not deflating at all) should not impact our conclusions. Any multiple on all prices is included in the
denominator and numerator of elasticities, meaning it will cancel out. I show this empirically in Section 2.5
in Chapter 2.
11I estimate store-level logit demand models for a subset of categories which include all products in the
scanner data in Figure 2.13. My results are unchanged by including these additional products.
12Technically, a UPC-version code combination is the finest level at which the data differentiates products,
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this scanner data in the next section.
1.4.2 Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel
The second dataset I use is the Nielsen Corporation’s Homescan Panel data, which
consists of a rotating panel of consumers who are asked to scan all of their purchases from
retailers. This data is available to me though an agreement with the Kilts Data Center at the
University of Chicago, and includes tens of thousands of households across the country and
millions of transactions. I use these data for two central purposes. First, because consumers
are followed through many purchases, they provide vital information about the frequency
with which consumers choose the outside option (i.e. not purchasing from a given product
category). This allows me to define market sizes (and therefore market shares). Second, I
use these data to test for behavior which might bias my estimates of demand. I describe this
test in Section 1.4.3.
To measure market sizes, for each product category in the panel I calculate the pro-
portion of consumers who buy a product in that module per week out of the total number of
consumers who buy from the category over the course of the year. I calculate this proportion
for each week and take the average over the year. Then, I use this average value to scale all
market shares (i.e. shares among inside options) calculated using the weekly scanner data.
These calculations, while imperfect, are straightforward and intuitive. If 100 consumers
purchase yogurt each year, but only 50 purchase in the average week, then the assumption
here is that something close to 50 consumers choose the outside option each week. For each
but this distinction will be of little importance to most of my analysis as I do not generally assume that all
attributes of UPCs remain constant over time.
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store, for each category, I multiply this ratio (2 in this example) by the maximum number of
units purchased in that store-category in any week of the year, which defines the market size
for that store in that module. Many classic studies use more ad-hoc definitions of market
size, such as population in a nearby region (e.g. the entire population of the United States,
or of a ZIP code). As such, although defining market size is often a difficult decision in
the estimation of structural demand models, this approach seems quite reasonable. I also
present one set of demand estimates which are robust to misspecification of market sizes.
1.4.3 Selecting Product Categories
Products in the Nielsen data are divided into hundreds of categories called “modules.”
These modules tend to define large but reasonable sets of substitutes. For example, refriger-
ated yogurt and fresh eggs are each a product module. Given the huge number of products
included in the Nielsen scanner data, and the computational costs of some of the structural
models estimated herein, studying all modules is unrealistic. To construct my sample of
products to study, I begin by selecting 41 modules from the set studied by DellaVigna and
Gentzkow (2019), broadly choosing categories which make up a large amount of store revenue
in the Nielsen data and which cover a large and potentially diverse set of products. Even
this is too many modules to include in this study, which raises the question of whether there
is a principled way to select which categories to study among this subset.
The approach I take in this vein is to exclude modules which are likely to yield biased
estimates due to a particular form of dynamic behavior. One issue which has been raised
in the literature on demand estimation, particularly in retail, is that estimating demand in
settings in which consumers tend to keep an inventory of products will often lead to biased
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estimates of price elasticities. This is largely due to the fact that, if consumers can keep a
large enough inventory, they can decide to buy many units when a product is on sale and
none otherwise. This type of behavior can generate demand estimates that imply very large
short run price elasticities, even if long run price elasticities are small (Hendel and Nevo,
2006). With this in mind, only product categories in which consumers do not keep a large
stock of products or target sales should be included in the main sample herein.13
In order to exclude any modules in which consumers exhibit this type of behavior, I
conduct a test which draws on the arguments in Hendel and Nevo (2006): if consumers are
unable to store goods, then a consumer’s purchase amount should not predict the time until
their next purchase. For each module, I estimate a regression motivated by this intuition
using the consumer panel data and test the null hypothesis that the previous purchase
amount does not predict the time between purchases (more details are included in Appendix
A). I then keep only the nine modules with the largest p-values for this test (all greater than
0.5). I list these nine modules in Table 1.1 as well as the number of stores in my sample
selling each category.14,15
13Of course, another option would be to introduce a dynamic model of demand instead of excluding some
modules. The computational costs of dynamic demand models are often severe, and would make much of
the analysis herein infeasible.
14Though most categories are given intuitive names, two which may require clarification are “Fresh Fruit
- Remaining” and “Fruit Drinks - Other Container.” The former contains the large majority of fruits in
grocery stores, and appears to only exclude a small handful of very popular fruits (e.g. apples and oranges).
The latter appears to contain most fruit-flavored drinks, including sports drinks and pure fruit juice blends.
15I also show that my results are not dependent on this particular test by calculating some results for
additional product categories in Figure 2.13.
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Table 1.1: Modules Without Evidence of Storage
Module Description # Stores
FRUIT DRINKS - OTHER CONTAINER 10994
SOUP-CANNED 10911
COOKIES 10995
PIZZA - FROZEN 7528
ICE CREAM - BULK 7393
ENTREES - REFRIGERATED 5613
YOGURT - REFRIGERATED 5742
FRESH FRUIT - REMAINING 4733
LIGHT BEER (LOW CALORIE/ALCOHOL) 4138
Note: Modules chosen following procedure in text. Full table including all considered product modules can
be found in the Appendix.
1.5 Motivating Empirical Facts
One of the most significant changes in retail over recent decades has been a drastic
increase in the use of information technology to manage supply chains and keep track of
inventory. The growing use of IT in supply chain management has been part of a trend in
retail firms toward demand-driven supply, often following dominant frameworks such as just-
in-time/quick response and efficient consumer response. See Fernie, Sparks and McKinnon
(2010), for example, for a full review of these changes with a focus on the United Kingdom.
These approaches tend to involve vertically integrating and passing data up the supply
chain, such that inventories are restocked at a rate which closely matches actual demand in
downstream stores (Fernie and Azuma, 2004). In the retail fashion industry, for example,
these methods have brought on significant cost reductions and faster production, leading to
a quicker turnover in stores’ inventory as consumer tastes change (Bhardwaj and Fairhurst,
2010). In grocery retail stores, and especially in the largest stores, the rise of IT technologies
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like RFID has made it easier to track inventory across levels of the supply chain (Shin and
Eksioglu, 2014).
According to a Consumer Reports article from 2014 citing numbers from the Food
Marketing Institute, the average number of products in a supermarket increased from less
than 9,000 in 1975 to almost 47,000 by 2008 (Consumer Reports, 2014). The Nielsen data
for the categories I study, which cover the following decade, are consistent with the contin-
uation of this trend. In the first week of 2006, the average store sold 385 of the products
in my sample. Stores selling all nine categories sold on average 804 products. In 2017,
these numbers were 488 and 930, respectively. These means mask a significant amount of
heterogeneity, which I demonstrate in Figure 1.2. For each store in my sample I calculate
the difference in the number of products sold (across all nine modules) between 2006 and
2017. In Figure 1.2(a) I plot the empirical density of these differences across all stores in my
sample, and in Figure 1.2(b) I do the same after restricting the sample to stores which sold
all nine modules at least once. The mean is more than 100 new products in each figure, as
denoted by the vertical grey lines, but many stores have increased their product selection in
these modules by 200 or more products. Both figures indicate that, even among this small
subset of modules, the number of products sold in many stores in my sample has increased
substantially between 2006 and 2017.16
Next, we should discuss the ways in which the (price and non-price) characteristics
of products sold have changed over time. The first piece of evidence in this direction comes
from the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS).
16I also show the full distribution of the number of products sold separately by module in Figure B.3.
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Note: Constructed from Nielsen scanner data. Figure (a) includes stores all stores in my sample, and Figure
(b) restricts the sample to stores which sold a product in each of the nine sample modules at least once in
my sample. Top and bottom 1% of the distributions have been trimmed.
In Figure 1.3 I reproduce two tables constructed by the ERS which describe a subset of
characteristics of new products as indicated by the Mintel Global New Products Database
(GNPD), via “tags” indicating product characteristics. The Mintel GNPD is a large database
of products which claims to add approximately 40,000 new products each month and covers
a significant fraction of products sold in over 80 countries. In Figure 1.3(a) , we can see
that according to this database the number of new products each year marked as “kosher,”
“gluten free,” “organic,” and “low/no/reduced allergen” has grown dramatically, often by
a factor of 2 or more. Figure 1.3(b), which presents these trends as a fraction of all new
products in the GNPD each year, demonstrates that the number of products with many
characteristics (e.g. “GMO free”) have grown not only in levels but as a proportion of new
products.
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Figure 1.3: Characteristics of New Products, USDA ERS
(a)
(b)
Note: Tables are reprinted from the USDA ERS website, and were constructed by USDA ERS using data
from the Mintel Global New Products Database. Downloaded by the author from https://www.ers.usda.
gov/topics/food-markets-prices/processing-marketing/new-products/.
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The Mintel data are meant to cover dozens of countries, meaning they are not nec-
essarily representative of the stores in my sample. The data Nielsen provides regarding the
characteristics of all products sold by retailers in their data are much less detailed, meaning
the extent to which we can match these trends in the Nielsen data is very limited. What can
be said is that the number of organic products in the scanner data has more than quadrupled
between 2006 and 2017, and the number of unique flavors has more than doubled. At the
same time, the total number of flavored products has actually declined, meaning the number
of unique flavors per flavored product has increased substantially over time. Though more
detailed product characteristics would be greatly beneficial both here and in estimating de-
mand, it is encouraging that these two measurable dimensions of product characteristics are
consistent with the increasing prevalence of new horizontal product characteristics.17
We will close this section with a discussion of prices and the size of the outside
option over time. Summary statistics of price in this setting can be difficult to interpret, as
consumer price indices often include grocery items like those in my sample. Thus, we should
expect that changes in real prices should on average be small. Moreover, as inflation has
been relatively low, nominal prices should also have been relatively constant over time. Still,
for completeness, in Table 1.2 I calculate the market share-weighted (i.e. sales weighted)
price in every store-week, and present the average across stores for each module.18 There
17For exact numbers associated with these claims, see Table B.1. I construct this table by matching annual
version files to the master file containing the full set of products in the scanner data. I consider a product
as having been sold in a given year if the versions file for that year can be matched to the file containing all
products.
18Any choice of weights to aggregate so many prices has its flaws. Weighting by market shares confounds
changes in consumer behavior with prices. Uniform weights on all prices would place too much weight on less
popular products, which make up a large fraction of unique products sold but a small fraction of purchased
goods. Cost weights would be ideal but I lack the data for such an approach.
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appears to be little to no pattern in changes in prices over time. Other than in the Yogurt
and Remaining Fruits categories, changes in average prices are quite small relative to 2006
prices.
Table 1.2: Share Weighted Price and Outside Option Size, by Module and Year
2006 2017
s0 Weighted Price s0 Weighted Price
Fruit Drinks 0.942 2.13 0.941 1.88
Soup 0.931 1.53 0.942 1.57
Cookies 0.910 2.22 0.914 2.20
Pizza 0.941 3.47 0.942 3.59
Ice Cream 0.939 3.86 0.946 3.75
Entrees 0.960 5.85 0.958 5.46
Yogurt 0.902 0.89 0.877 1.43
Remaining Fruit 0.973 4.43 0.913 3.70
Light Beer 0.942 11.56 0.945 12.08
Note: Selected summary statistics for nine modules. The “Weighted Price” column presents the average
(across stores and weeks) of the market share-weighted price among goods in my sample, and s0 presents
the average size of the outside option market share across stores and weeks.
Price dispersion is also important to document here, as increasing dispersion could
potentially indicate rising price discrimination even in the absence of changes in average
prices. For example, if a firm introduced a high- and a low-quality good, it could set a high
price for the former and a low price for the latter in equilibrium. Thus, differentiation would
generate larger price dispersion. I show in Figure 1.4 that this does not appear to have
been the case. For each store and module, I calculate the coefficient of variation of prices
in the first week of 2006 and 2017. Then, in Figures 1.4(a) and (b) I plot kernel density
estimates and empirical cumulative distribution functions of these coefficients of variations
in each year. Both plots indicate at most a small increase in the dispersion of price over
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time. Together, Figure 1.4 and Table 1.2 indicate that the distribution of prices has changed
little over time, meaning that to the extent that markups have risen, much of this growth
must be due to cost reductions.


























Note: Constructed from scanner files in Nielsen. Figure (a) presents the estimated kernel density of coef-
ficients of variation within a store-module in the first week of 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (red, dashed).
Figure (b) presents empirical cumulative distribution functions.
Finally, in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.2 I present the average (across stores and weeks)
of the market share of the outside option (i.e. no purchase within the category) for each
module. If a module had become much more desirable on average over my sample period,
or if products had become significantly higher quality, the size of the outside option would
be smaller, and substitution to the outside option would generally be weaker. If this were
the case, estimates of changes in substitution patterns over time might capture this feature
in addition to the introduction of niche goods. As is the case with prices, the average size of
the outside option has changed little, except in the Yogurt and Remaining Fruit categories.
The similarity of columns 2 and 4 implies that this type of differentiation is unlikely to drive
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results below, though I return to a brief discussion of vertical differentiation at the end of
Section 3.2 in Chapter 3.
To summarize, in this section I have shown that the number of products sold in
retail stores in my sample has increased significantly over recent decades, at the same time
as retail supply chains have become increasingly streamlined and demand focused. Over a
similar period, the number of products with new, or previously rare, characteristics has also
grown globally, and within the Nielsen data to the extent that this can be measured. To the
contrary, prices and the size of the outside option have moved relatively little over time. Thus,
although simplistic measures of horizontal characteristics are consistent with rising variety
and/or the nicheness of retail food products, evidence for changes in vertical attributes and
for rising prices is much weaker. If we find rising differentiation, then, the primary focus
will be on horizontal differentiation. Moreover, if pricing patterns over my sample period
are consistent with rising markups, that trend most likely to be due to declining marginal
costs.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have offered motivating empirical and theoretical evidence that retail
food stores may have been able to increase their markups on many prices by offering goods
which are increasingly “niche.” The simple theoretical model presented demonstrates that
niche goods, as measured by the variance of consumer preferences, become more valuable to
a firm as stocking costs decline. I show this both in terms of simple intuitive examples and
by simulating an example in a logit demand model. Given the evidence that many retail
firms have developed more advanced supply chains in recent years, these models suggest that
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these firms have faced a growing incentive to offer niche goods.
After describing the conclusions of this model, I then established that although the
number of goods offered by retail stores, as well as the non-price characteristics of those
goods, have changed over time, the distribution of prices has remained relatively stable over
time. This finding is informative about the mechanisms and welfare impacts of any potential
rising markups in this industry. If prices had increased significantly over the observed time
period, then conclusions about consumer surplus would be much more complicated, as one
would have to weigh the gains from variety and nicheness against rising prices. In addition,
if prices had risen on average, we might worry that product quality had increased substan-
tially. This can also generate declining substitution between goods and would complicate the
hypothesis herein. To the contrary, as predicted by the theoretical model, we have evidence
that non-price characteristics have changed substantially over the sample period.
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Chapter 2
Measuring Differentiation and Markups Over Time
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study the extent to which consumers have become more or less
willing to substitute between the available goods in retail food stores over time. As shown
in the preceding chapter, the choice sets available to consumers in these stores have become
larger and more diverse. Given this evidence, in this chapter we are interested in studying
whether or not consumers have responded to these changes by becoming less price sensitive,
as was the prediction of the model introduced in Chapter 1. Estimates of consumer demand
over time can then be used, via an assumption on firm behavior, to measure the magnitude
of markups which could have been the result of these changing substitution patterns.
Measuring consumers’ sensitivity to price convincingly relies on credible estimates of
demand for many products at a granular level. Moreover, an empirical model of demand
for thousands of products which span many categories should be as flexible and general as
possible while remaining tractable and computationally feasible. In order to ensure that my
results are robust to a variety of assumptions on consumer preferences, I estimate demand
for nine product categories in three ways in Section 2.2 (and twice more in Section 3.2 in the
next chapter). In the first, I follow the canonical approach in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) (BLP), which estimates structural utility parameters in a discrete choice
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framework. This model permits significant unobserved heterogeneity differentiating products
and stores, but assumes that the distribution of consumer preferences (e.g. over horizontal
product characteristics) is the same at every store.1 In a second approach, I estimate separate
structural demand parameters for every three-digit ZIP code, for every category in every year,
using an approximation to a structural model as developed by Salanié and Wolak (2019).
This results in hundreds of estimated structural preference parameters each year for every
product category in my sample. In the third, I focus instead on estimating more than 100,000
constant elasticity demand curves at the store-category level in an approach very similar to
that taken by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) in their study of uniform pricing.
My results indicate that consumers are substantially less willing to substitute between
products in 2017 than in 2006. My estimates from a BLP-style model imply that own-price
elasticities have declined from -2.17 to -1.65 at the median across all products in my sample.
I find a similar pattern with respect to cross-price elasticities and in all but one of the nine
studied categories. Using estimates of preferences which vary at the three-digit ZIP code
level, I show that these declines appear to be in part the direct result of changes in consumer
utility functions, specifically in the effective disutility of price. Finally, I demonstrate that
under a monopoly pricing rule the observed substitution patterns and prices are consistent
with an increase in markups in most modules, both at the median and along much of the
interquartile range. Because I hold this pricing model fixed over time, these results indicate
that retail food stores may have been able to sustain larger markups over time solely due
to the fact that the portfolio of goods they offer contains better matches for consumers’
1This is slightly exaggerated, as my inclusion of store-product fixed effects permits the mean preferences
for goods to vary across stores. Still, the distribution of preferences for price and the random utility shocks
are assumed not to differ across stores.
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idiosyncratic preferences. This has potentially important implications for the welfare effects
of these markups, as it implies that both consumers and firms may be better off in 2017 than
in 2006.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I present a structural model of
demand which will be the focus of the chapter. In Section 2.3, I discuss the estimation of this
model as well as two additional models which make alternative assumptions concerning the
geographic heterogeneity of preferences and the extent to which products are substitutable.
I then present my estimates of price elasticities and markups resulting from each of these
models in Section 2.4, and offer a few additional robustness checks in Section 2.5. I end the
chapter with a concluding discussion in Section 2.6.
2.2 Structural Model of Demand
In order to measure the extent to which products have become more differentiated
over time we require estimates of the extent to which consumers are willing to substitute
between products. More precisely, we need estimates of the own- and cross-price elasticities
of demand of many products. Toward that end, I estimate a number of models of demand
which permit flexibility in differing directions, most of which fall into the following class of
demand systems. I assume that, after choosing a store at which to shop, consumers select
among the available products within a product module to maximize indirect utility functions
28
of the form
uijsw = αi(z)pjsw + ξjsw + εijsw
αi(z) ∼ N(ᾱ(z), σ2α,(z))
ui0sw = εi0sw
I use the indices i, j, s, and w to denote consumer, products, store, and week respectively.
The parenthetical subscript (z) refers to three-digit ZIP codes. Consumers are differentiated
by two terms: αi and εijt. The coefficient ᾱi(z) represents the disutility of price for consumer
i and is modeled as a normal distribution. The subscripts (z) are used to indicate that in
some results, which I describe more in future sections, I permit both the mean and variance
of αi to differ in each three-digit ZIP code. Consumers also have idiosyncratic preferences ε
for each product in each week (including the outside option), which are distributed according
to a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution with scale parameter σ. I also permit all consumers
in in each store to observe an unobserved product- and market-specific characteristic ξjsw
which is not observed by the econometrician. In this model, market shares for each product












This model permits product differentiation to change between 2006 and 2017 through
three channels. First, the variance of ε may change over time. The associated scale parameter
σ is the key parameter controlling horizontal differentiation and therefore the “nicheness”
of products. The larger is σ, the larger the variance of ε (relative to pjst), and the less
responsive is demand for a given product to changes in price. This can be seen directly in
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Equation 2.1, where clearly larger values of σ reduces the effective coefficient on price (αi
σ
).
In the fullest generality, the variance of ε might differ across products within a year, as some
products are naturally more broadly appealing (i.e. less niche) than others. With the large
number of products in my data, estimating such a model is infeasible. Although I estimate
a model with more than one scaling parameter in Section 3.2, for now I will think of σ
variance as capturing year-level average preference heterogeneity across products. Changes
in this variance will be particularly important if more niche products have been introduced
over time.
Products can also be vertically differentiated by the unobserved product characteristic
ξ, which permits products to be weak substitutes even conditional on price and preference
shocks. In most of the demand models I estimate, ξ will take the form:
ξjsw = ξ̄js + ξ̄(s),(z),w + ∆ξjsw (2.2)
where ξ̄js denotes average preferences for product j (relative to the outside option) at store s,
and ξ̄w represents the average preferences for the outside option in a given week, which I also
let vary either at the store or three-digit ZIP code level. The former permits consumers, on
average, to rank products differently at each store, which might occur for a number of reasons
including geography-specific advertising, consumers sorting across chains, or heterogeneous
willingness to pay for quality (e.g. due in part to wealth). The latter is a nonparametric
way to capture seasonality in average preferences for all goods within a category. This seems
particularly important for seasonal goods like Ice Cream, but may also play a role in other
categories.
Finally, the distribution of αi is crucial in determining consumers’ willingness to trade
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money for utility. If consumers at the stores in my sample are significantly wealthier in real
terms in 2017 relative to 2006 (and relative to grocery prices) then they may be less price
sensitive, all else equal. This would be captured in my estimates largely through ᾱ and σα,
where the former measures average preferences for price and the latter measures preference
heterogeneity within a market. In some estimates, I will also permit the distribution of
αi to differ by geography (three-digit ZIP code or store), thereby capturing differences in




Estimation of demand systems like the baseline model herein has been studied by a
substantial literature since the original “BLP” paper (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995).
Current best practices are implemented in a new Python package called pyblp, written by
Chris Conlon and Jeff Gortmaker (Conlon and Gortmaker, 2019). This package provides
empirical IO researchers with an easily customizable way to estimate this standard demand
model, and implements cutting edge numerical tools to speed up estimation. Though the lit-
erature describing the estimation of this type of model is long and in-depth, for completeness
I describe the procedure below as well.
2Some readers may have a preference a nested logit model in which all inside goods constitute a nest.
The fixed effects I include accomplish some of the goals of this approach, and I find that nested models are
much less likely to converge given my inclusion of product-store fixed effects. In Figures B.1 and Figures
B.2 I show one case in which a nested logit model does converge (for Light Beer) with UPC and week fixed
effects. The results are similar to those in the next section.
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We can rewrite the random utility model in Section 2.2 as follows:
uijsw = δjsw + σανi + εijsw (2.3)
where δjsw = ᾱpjsw+ξjsw is the common component of utility derived from product j in store
s in week w, νi is a standard normal random variable, and ε is an idiosyncratic error term




). Although I normalize the scale parameter of ε in each module-year, by letting
both the price coefficients αi and the unobserved characteristics ξ vary across modules and
time I am implicitly letting the variance of preferences vary as well. This is because the
scale of utility and the variance of ε are not separately identified without some additional
structure (to see this, note that doubling utility and the scale parameter leaves Equation 2.1
unchanged). Changes in estimates of α should therefore be interpreted as some combination
of changes in the disutility of price and changes in the variance of ε. In Section 3.2 I perform
a decomposition which measures the relative importance of these two components of utility
in explaining changes in price elasticities over time.
For each guess of the “nonlinear” parameter σα, which again captures heterogeneity






k exp(δksw + σανi)
dνi (2.4)




jsw + log(sjsw) − log(ŝjsw)
3Following the frontier of the literature (and the default in pyblp), this problem is solved via the squarem
algorithm (Varadhan and Roland, 2008; Reynaerts, Varadha and Nash, 2012).
4I calculate the integral in Equation 2.4 using Gaussian quadrature.
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where ŝjsw is the model predicted vector of market shares. After δjsw converges for each
market we can recover α by regressing δjsw on price (usually instrumenting for price). This
regression also generates estimates of ξjsw, which can be used to enforce the following moment
conditions to identify α and σ.
E[∆ξjswZjsw] = 0, (2.5)
where ∆ξjsw represents the residual of ξ after absorbing fixed effects and Zjsw = (pjsw, p
2
jsw).
I explain in Section 2.3.4 why price serves as a valid instrument in this and proceeding models.
I include many fixed effects in this model in order to incorporate the mean preferences
described in Section 2.2.
I include product-store fixed effects in this model, which allow some products to
be persistently more desirable (e.g. higher quality) than other similarly priced goods. By
permitting product fixed effects to take a different value at each store, the ranking of unob-
servable product characteristics and the distance between two products on this unobservable
dimension can differ flexibly across geographies and chains. These product-store fixed effects
are crucial in estimating demand for such a wide variety of geographic markets, as consumers
may rank products differently in different parts of the country. Finally, I allow for consumer
preferences for the outside option to vary at the store-week level, meaning that consumers’
average willingness to purchase goods within each category is also left unrestricted across




One important critique of the preceding model, especially in this setting in which
I observe so many stores around the country, is that I do not permit the distribution of
αi to differ geographically. In reality, consumer price sensitivity likely substantively differs
across regions of the country. The most direct extension of the preceding model to permit
geographic heterogeneity would be to estimate a different pair of distributional parameters
α and σ in each three-digit ZIP code (the finest level of geographic information in my data).
This would require estimating hundreds of parameters via GMM (jointly or separately by
geography), which is a complicated computational problem. In particular, after attempting
this for some modules, the problem is that the contraction mapping necessary to deal with
preference heterogeneity (σα) is still relatively time consuming even when the sample is
small. As a result, estimating BLP separately by three-digit ZIP code is too computationally
burdensome to attempt here.5
Recently, Salanié and Wolak (2019) introduced what they call the Fast, “Robust,” and
Approximately Correct (FRAC) procedure for the estimation of mixed logit demand models.
Their paper shows that, just as logit models (i.e. models with no random coefficients) can be
estimated via an appropriately specified linear IV regression, random coefficient models like
the one considered here can be approximated by a very similar regression. Their work offers
the following approximation, similar to the frequently used logit inversion, for the demand
5The route often taken in studies of random coefficient models like the one here is to include demographic
characteristics in the utility function. In some initial work (not included here) I find that the sample of
consumers in the household panel data is insufficient to estimate the store-level demographic distribution
precisely. One could aggregate demographics to the three-digit ZIP code level, but this involves a high
computational cost and is not necessarily more flexible than my FRAC estimates, which are robust to
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To estimate this model, one need only construct the regressor K in Equation 2.6 and
run an IV regression which will yield estimates of σ2α and ᾱ.
6 Absorbing fixed effects as in the
preceding BLP model is straightforward, and without imposing additional constraints there
is even a closed form solution for the parameters of interest. Thus, introducing geographic
heterogeneity becomes much more feasible under this approximation. We can estimate such






≡ yjsw = ᾱzpjsw + σ2α,zKjsw + ξjsw (2.7)
where ᾱz and σ
2
α,z are again the mean and variance of random coefficients on price, which I
now allow to differ in each three-digit ZIP code in my sample. With between 500 and 800
three-digit ZIP codes represented in each module, this approximate model permits drastically
more heterogeneity in price elasticities across markets than the preceding model, at the cost
of requiring the estimation of far more parameters.
In estimating this FRAC model in this setting, I often find estimates of ᾱz which
are positive and σ2α,z which are negative, seemingly because pjsw and Kjsw are very highly
6Note that, even when prices are exogenous, OLS estimates of Equation 2.6 will be biased in general, as
the constructed regressor K includes market shares which are endogenous by construction.
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correlated (nearly co-linear in some ZIP codes). The former is inconsistent with basic eco-
nomic theory, and the latter is nonsensical. Broadly speaking, I find one or more of these
issues in 10% (or more) of the ZIP codes in my samples. There are a number of ways to
deal with these estimates, some more ad-hoc than others. The approach I take is to convert
the original regression to a constrained GMM problem, in which I constrain the mean price
coefficient ᾱz to be nonpositive and the variance σ
2
α,z to be nonnegative.
In practice, I estimate this constrained FRAC model separately for each three-digit
ZIP code, dropping ZIP codes with fewer than 500 total observations in a module-year. I
include product-store and (ZIP code-)week fixed effects, which I absorb in advance using
the methods (and author-written code) introduced by Somaini and Wolak (2016). Let y+,





, p, and K after absorbing this set of fixed effects.
Further, let Z+ ≡ (p+, p2(+), p3(+)) denote the vector of polynomial terms in price (after
absorbing fixed effects) which I use as instruments. Estimation for each three-digit ZIP code
















s.t. αz ≤ 0
σα,z ≥ 0
∆ξjsw ≡ (y+jsw − αzp+jsw − σ2α,zK+jsw)
Where Ê denotes the sample mean and W is a weighting matrix which is initially set to
(Z
′
Z/N)−1 and is updated in a second step following the standard two-step efficient GMM
procedure. I find that enforcing these constraints performs very well, and the constraints on
ᾱz are almost never binding in most product modules. I do find that estimates of σα,z are very
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close to zero in some modules.7 After estimation, I calculate own- and cross-price elasticities
using the standard mixed logit formulas, and the relevant integrals are approximated using
200 Halton draws.
2.3.3 Constant Elasticity
One reasonable critique of mixed logit models is that the structural interpretation
of their estimates relies on correctly specifying the utility function and the size of each
market. These are strong assumptions, meaning it may be fruitful to consider estimates of
substitution patterns which make different assumptions, as a sort of robustness check. To
this end, I also consider an approach similar to that taken by DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2019), a recent paper highlighting the extent of uniform pricing in retail settings which
also uses the Nielsen data. Instead of estimating a structural model, we can target the
store-module demand function via the following regression for each store and module:
log(sjsw) = ηslog(pjsw) + ξ̄js + ∆ξjsw (2.9)
where ηs is the store- and module-specific price elasticity, ξ̄js are UPC-store fixed effects. As
in my other estimates, these regressions are estimated separately by year and by product
module. Though targeting this demand function directly has some aforementioned advan-
tages, note that this specification does not directly address substitution between products.
7Another reasonable approach would be to apply an empirical Bayes procedure to the distribution of
estimates of ᾱz and σ
2
α,z. Empirical Bayes methods are motivated by the fact that extreme estimates of
parameters are likely the result of measurement error. One can regularize these estimates, shifting them
closer to the mean. In early work I found this approach to be much less successful at eliminating nonsensical
results than imposing constraints.
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Thus, we cannot calculate any estimates of cross-price elasticities from this model.8 Still,
estimates of ηs can inform us of the extent to which price increases lead to declines in quan-
tity demanded, while imposing a different structure than that required by logit models. As
shown in Section 1.5, substitution to the outside option has not increased in general over
the sample period, meaning that changes in η will largely be due to changing cross-product
substitution patterns. To the extent that estimates of ηs support the conclusions of the other
estimated models, this strengthens the findings herein significantly.9
Estimating this model yields more than 100,000 estimates of ηs (across all stores and
modules). Although I drop stores with fewer than 200 total observations in a module-year
it is likely, given the relatively small sample used to estimate each ηs, that the most extreme
estimates are due in large part to measurement error. Comparisons involving these noise-
ridden estimates are likely to overstate changes over time, as some estimates in 2006 are less
precise than their 2017 counterpart (largely due to the growth in the number of products,
i.e. observations, per store). To alleviate some of this concern, I employ an empirical Bayes
shrinkage procedure, following Morris (1983) and as implemented in Chandra et al. (2016)10.
This procedure “shrinks” estimates which are imprecisely estimated toward the module-year
mean of estimates, and is similar to many recent empirical papers which estimate a large
8If this model is interpreted in the Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013) framework, then the inverse demand
function includes only a product’s own price and market share, meaning cross-price elasticities are identically
zero. This interpretation also indicates that structural interpretation of this demand model requires a strong
form of symmetry, as a more general model (even without cross-substitution) would imply that η should
differ for every product.
9To estimate this model, I absorb product-store fixed effects from prices and market shares using the
reghdfe command in Stata (Correia, 2016) and then run the user-written regressby (by Michael Droste) to
estimate Equation 2.9 at every store for each module. I calculate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
which I adjust manually to account for absorbed degrees of freedom.
10I implement this approach via the ebayes Stata command written by Adam Sacarny.
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number of parameters of interest (e.g. fixed effects) (Abaluck et al., 2020; Hull, 2018). All
proceeding discussions and figures involving estimates of ηs refer to estimates after applying
this shrinkage procedure unless otherwise specified.
2.3.4 Price Endogeneity
In estimating all models of demand in this chapter I treat prices as exogenous with
respect to changes in market- and product-level unobservable (to the econometrician) deter-
minants of demand. As much of the IO literature has focused on developing good instruments
for price, some time should be spent to explain why prices in the retail sector seem unlikely
to be affected by the traditional critique, that prices are set by firms in response to (or
anticipation of) changes in consumer demand which are observed by the firm and not by the
econometrician (i.e. ∆ξjsw).
To justify the use of price as an instrument, I operate under two assumptions: (i)
prices are set before the demand shock ∆ξjsw is realized, and (ii) firms are unable to predict
these shocks in advance. With regard to (i), evidence suggests that menu costs are non-trivial
(Stamatopoulos, Bassamboo and Moreno, 2020), meaning stores are unlikely to be able to
respond quickly to small changes in demand. On (ii), recent work by Hitsch, Hortacsu
and Lin (2019) (using the Nielsen data as well) indicate that even store-level differences
in demand within a chain may be difficult to precisely estimate given the data that firms
are likely to have. Given this finding, weekly variation in product-specific demand seems
significantly less likely to be well estimated by managers. Note also that I include product-
store fixed effects in all estimates and either store-week or ZIP code-week fixed effects in my
structural estimates, and that price only needs to be uncorrelated with the residual ∆ξjsw
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after absorbing these fixed effects. I am therefore only assuming that prices are exogenous
with respect to changes in demand within a product at a given store. This means that firms
can price according to store-specific demand for each product, as well as (in my structural
estimates) store-level changes in demand across weeks (e.g. seasonality in demand for ice
cream), but assumes that firms do not price according to changes in demand for a product
in a given week. This argument is similar to that made in Hitsch, Hortacsu and Lin (2019),
who also estimate a model of demand treating prices as exogenous conditional on a similar
set of fixed effects.
There are a number of other pricing behaviors which could also make prices exogenous
conditional on the included fixed effects, even if the timing assumption I make is invalid.
Existing evidence indicates that many retail chains appear to price nearly uniformly across
stores within a week. Whether this is indicative of uniform or zone pricing on the part
of retail chains (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019; Adams and Williams, 2019) or uniform
markups over geographically homogeneous wholesale costs (Butters, Sacks and Seo, 2020),
uniform prices significantly limit the extent to which prices can be priced in response to
market demand shifters. In a different vein, Conlon and Rao (2019) present evidence that
retailers selling alcohol in Connecticut tend to set prices at a small number of discrete values
(e.g. those ending in “.99”), and that the majority of prices that change in response to tax
increases move by whole dollar increments. Anecdotally, this is true more broadly, and the
extent of endogenous price responses is naturally limited to the extent that firms maintain
this discrete pricing behavior in the categories I study.11
11For example, many changes in demand which the firm might respond to are likely small enough that the
optimal price changes by less than a dollar. If firms are constrained (e.g. by norms) to end prices in 0.99,
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There is also evidence that retail stores do not respond by changing prices in responses
to changes in local competition. For example, although Arcidiacono et al. (2019) find a
significant effect of superstore entry on incumbents’ revenue, they find no such effect on
price. That is, even when the entry of a new competitor decreases revenue at a given
store by more than 10%, that store tends not to decrease its prices in any meaningful way.
They conclude that the most likely explanation for this pair of findings is that stores follow
pricing strategies which are independent of the demand they face. In particular, they argue
(drawing on evidence from Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011)) that so-called “cost-
plus” pricing is most likely. The key remaining source of potential endogeneity comes from
inventory behavior on the part of consumers, which I assume has been addressed by the
procedure in Section 1.4.3.
2.4 Results
In this section I offer two broad sets of results. First, I show that own- and cross-price
elasticities have declined over time across a broad range of products and in each of the models
of demand I have estimated. Second, I calculate markups implied by monopoly pricing at the
module-store-week level. These hypothetical markups are not meant to be estimates of true
retailer markups. Rather, this calculation is a helpful way to learn the general magnitude of
the effect these changes in demand may have had on retailers’ variable profits to date. Given
the substantial recent literature on retail pricing, any assumed pricing strategy seems likely
to be misspecified. These markups simply offer a way to measure whether the substitution
then the firm may not respond at all to such a demand shock. More broadly, the firm can only fully respond
to the very specific shocks to consumer demand which imply that the optimal price is one of the acceptable
discrete values.
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patterns shown here are sufficient to imply increases in markups under a simple model.
2.4.1 Demand Estimates
2.4.1.1 BLP
In Figure 2.1(a) I plot my first set of results, which are kernel densities of the dis-
tribution of price elasticities across all stores and products (in all nine modules) in my
sample for 2006 and 2017. These distributions, which are composed of more than 150 mil-
lion product-store-week observations, indicate a substantial shift to toward zero over this
decade. Although much of the distribution in 2006 is to the left of -2, by 2017 we can see
that the distribution has shifted significantly to the right. In columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.1,
I present estimates of various quantiles of each of these distributions, ranging from the 5th
percentile to the 95th. At each quantile, price elasticities are noticeably smaller in 2017 (in
absolute value) than in 2006. On average, price elasticities declined from -2.16 to -1.62, a
change of 25%, and very similarly at the median.12
Cross-price elasticities show a similar shift toward zero. In Figure 2.1(b), I calculate
the average cross-price elasticity for each product in each market, and plot the distribution
of these averages in 2006 and 2017. Dealing with averages smooths the distributions signif-
icantly, meaning some detail is lost, but it necessary due to the disk space which would be
required to store the full set of cross-price elasticities for all observations. Consistent with
the notion that differentiation has increased in some way, cross-price elasticities have shifted
12One reasonable concern is that many estimated own-price elasticities, especially in 2017, are less than 1
in absolute value (this is true in all results which follow as well). In standard models, this implies that firms
are not short-run profit maximizing. To this point, one should note that Hitsch, Hortacsu and Lin (2019)
estimate tens of millions of price elasticities across thousands of products using the Nielsen data and also
find that many price elasticities are less than 1.
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Note: BLP estimates of own-price elasticities across all 9 modules in the first 16 weeks of 2006 and 2017.
Top and bottom 1% of each distribution have been trimmed.
significantly toward zero in 2017 relative to 2006, meaning changes in prices of goods are
much less likely to induce substitution between products in 2017 than even a decade before.
Figures 2.1(a) and (b) together demonstrate the headline result of this chapter: differentia-
tion appears to have substantially increased across many stores and products in the United
States.
These results, while stark, aggregate over much of the variation in the data. One
appeal of the level of detail provided by the Nielsen scanner data is that we can study
whether substitution patterns have changed similarly across different groups of products.
The median own-price elasticities in each module-year can be found in columns 1 and 3 of
Table 2.2. In all but one of the nine modules I study (Ice Cream), I find that own-price
elasticities have shifted toward zero substantially over the sample period.13 Of the modules
13Notably, among all 18 estimated BLP models, my only numerical issue arises in my 2006 estimates for
Ice Cream, where I find that σ̂α touches the lower bound I enforce in estimation.
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which see an increase in differentiation, the median decline ranges from approximately 11%
(Frozen Pizza) to more than 30% (Fruit Drinks and Yogurt). Recall that estimates for
each module in each year are the result of structural BLP estimates of demand which are
estimated entirely separately from each other (18 estimated demand models in total). Thus,
the changes we see in these substitution patterns in many modules are identified solely by
within-module variation over time. Thus, the agreement of all but one module is strong
initial evidence that price sensitivity has declined broadly.14 I now move on to the FRAC
model, which relaxes the assumption that the distribution of preferences is homogeneous in
all stores.
Table 2.1: Own-Price Elasticities and Implied Markups
2006 2017
BLP Own-Price Elasticity Markup Own-Price Elasticity Markup
5% -3.13 -1.19 -2.47 -10.00
25% -2.60 1.72 -2.00 1.88
Median -2.17 1.98 -1.65 2.36
75% -1.75 2.40 -1.27 3.20
95% -1.06 4.62 -0.72 8.31
FRAC
5% -5.94 -1.85 -3.65 -8.42
25% -3.09 1.64 -2.30 1.72
Median -2.34 1.92 -1.77 2.32
75% -1.74 2.47 -1.29 3.45
95% -0.93 5.94 -0.73 11.33
Note: Shown are the mean, median, and other quantiles of the own-price elasticity and implied markup
distribution for all BLP and FRAC estimates, pooling all nine modules in my sample.
14Though omitted here, for each module, I also calculate the average own-price elasticity estimate within
each UPC in each year, and plot the distributions of these means across products in both years. The full set
of module-specific plots of this form are shown in Figure B.4.
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Table 2.2: Median Price Elasticities and Implied Markups, by Year and Module
BLP Own-Price 2006 Markups 2006 Own-Price 2017 Markups 2017
Fruit Drinks -2.47 1.79 -1.66 2.26
Soup -2.09 2.09 -1.50 3.14
Cookies -2.01 2.16 -1.52 3.06
Pizza -2.59 1.80 -2.31 1.89
Ice Cream -1.88 2.22 -2.01 2.20
Entrees -1.91 2.19 -1.60 2.46
Yogurt -2.16 2.15 -1.40 2.48
Remaining Fruit -2.38 1.75 -1.87 2.47
Light Beer -3.36 1.49 -2.93 1.62
FRAC
Fruit Drinks -2.26 1.82 -1.55 2.20
Soup -4.00 1.97 -2.41 2.90
Cookies -2.08 2.01 -1.59 2.55
Pizza -2.31 1.88 -2.22 1.90
Ice Cream -1.93 2.01 -1.87 2.28
Entrees -1.92 2.09 -1.55 2.42
Yogurt -2.28 1.89 -1.44 2.13
Remaining Fruit -2.40 1.73 -2.04 2.18
Light Beer -3.13 1.49 -2.23 1.67
Note: Shown are the medians of the full distribution of own-price elasticities and implied markups for 2006
and 2017, calculated separately for each module studied. Estimates shown separately for BLP and FRAC
estimates.
2.4.1.2 FRAC
The preceding estimates, while able to approximate flexible substitution patterns,
do make the strong assumption that both the mean and variance of preferences for price
are identical across locations. Further, because price elasticities represent a combination of
revealed preferences and equilibrium prices, it is uncertain whether changing preferences (i.e.
changing differentiation) plays a critical role in these estimates. Now I move to my second
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set of demand estimates, i.e. those from the FRAC approach, which will address both of
these concerns to some degree. In many ways, the results of this section are very similar to
those in the preceding section.
The central way in which these FRAC results differ from BLP estimates is that I
have estimated preferences independently in many geographies. In Figure 2.2 I present the
distribution of my estimates of the mean of random coefficients on price in the utility function
(ᾱ) across three-digit ZIP codes in each year. These figures show us that, in each product
module, estimated average price coefficients are significantly smaller in 2017 than in 2006.
Note that these are estimates of utility parameters, and thus provide a new result relative
to the preceding BLP estimates. Because the densities in 2017 (blue, dashed) are often
significantly to the right of the densities in 2006 (black), this implies a shift in the effective
disutility of price over the span of the sample. As in my BLP estimates, each density in
this figure is the result of an entirely separate estimation procedure, making their relative
agreement quite stark. This is even more true here, where each density is the result of
hundreds of (approximate) mixed logit demand estimates.
As described in Section 2.3.1, these estimates of ᾱ confound two potential changes.




This means that estimated changes in ᾱ may be the result of changes in σ (which scales
the variance of ε) or changes in ᾱ itself. The latter could be the driving force if consumer
wealth has increased substantially relative to prices in these categories, or if the demographic
composition of consumers at the stores in my sample has changed significantly. The former,
to the contrary, would indicate that products are, on average, more niche in 2017 than in
2006 (because preferences in 2017 have larger variance). For now, these are indistinguishable,
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but in Section 3.2 I demonstrate that preference heterogeneity specifically plays a significant
role.
Now turning to estimates of differentiation, the story is quite similar to that in the
preceding section. In Figure 2.3 I plot the distribution of own-price elasticities across all
nine modules after trimming the top and bottom 1% in each year. Again, I find that this
distribution has shifted significantly to the right in 2017 relative to 2006, and estimated
own-price elasticities are similar in magnitude to my BLP estimates in both years. At the
median, these elasticities have declined from -2.34 to -1.77, and a similar decline is also found
at the mean and at a number of percentiles of the distribution, as described in columns 1 and
3 of Table 2.1. I also present median own-price elasticities for each module in each year in
Table 2.2, which demonstrates that own-price elasticities have declined in all modules. The
distribution of cross-price elasticities (Figure 2.3(b)) also exhibits a noticeable shift toward
zero.15
Although I have estimated the FRAC model to permit geographic preferences het-
erogeneity, up to this point it is unclear whether the heterogeneity I find in my estimates
represents differing preferences or estimation error. To be specific, one may worry that the
variance, and in particular the long left tail, of own-price elasticities and estimated utility
parameters here largely represents estimation error around BLP estimates from the preced-
ing section, due to the relatively small sample size contributing to each FRAC estimate. If
this were driving all of the estimated differences, FRAC estimates of ᾱ would be uncorrelated
across modules. I show in Table 2.3 that this is not the case. To the contrary, estimates
15I also calculate UPC-level average own-price elasticities for each module-year, which I omit here to save
space but display in Figure B.6.
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are generally significantly correlated across modules in both years. This seems to imply
that preferences for price, and/or the nicheness of products, do differ significantly across
geographies. Whereas this geographic heterogeneity can be quite difficult to incorporate in
the standard BLP estimation procedure, it is easily incorporated in FRAC.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Estimates of ZIP Code-Level Price Coefficients
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(g) Yogurt (h) Remaining Fruit (i) Light Beer
Note: Distributions of estimated mean utility coefficient on price, in 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (blue,
dashed). Estimates come from solving the constrained least squares problem in Section 2.3.2 separately for
each three-digit ZIP code, module, and year.
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Table 2.3: Correlation Between FRAC Estimates Across Modules, 2006 and 2017




Pizza 0.53 0.19 0.49
Ice Cream 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.45
Entrees 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.5 0.5
Yogurt 0.29 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.41 0.41
Remaining Fruit 0.28 0.39 0.49 0.48 0.11 0.51 0.27





Pizza 0.42 0.57 0.4
Ice Cream 0.27 0.05 0.35 0.24
Entrees 0.26 0.39 0.47 0.53 0.44
Yogurt 0.05 0.03 0.37 0.14 0.05 0.12
Remaining Fruit 0.23 -0.02 0.17 -0.06 0.13 0.03 0.23
Light Beer 0.34 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.3 0.27 -0.04 0.08
Note: Correlation matrix of all FRAC estimates of the mean coefficient on price in consumer utility functions
(ᾱ) in 2006 and 2017.
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Note: FRAC estimates of own- and (average) cross-price elasticities across all 9 modules in the first 16 weeks
of 2006 and 2017. Top and bottom 1% of own-price elasticities have been trimmed, as have the top and
bottom 5% of average cross-price elasticities in each year.
2.4.1.3 Constant Elasticity
I now present my estimates of the constant elasticity demand model, for which I
estimate more than 100,000 store-level price elasticities. As mentioned in the estimation
section, I apply an empirical Bayes shrinkage procedure to these estimates before plotting
them here. The distributions of these (post-shrinkage) estimates are shown in Figures 2.4(a)
and (b).16 In Figure 2.4(a) I plot the full distribution of module-store-level estimates of
price elasticities in 2006 and 2017. In order to demonstrate that no single product module is
driving these results, in Figure 2.4(b) I calculate store-level averages of estimated elasticities
and plot the distribution of these averages across stores. A figure replacing store-level means
16Table B.2 presents the mean and selected quantiles of the distribution of pre- and post-shrinkage esti-
mates. The two distributions are generally very similar.
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with medians looks very similar. As in the two structural models, these estimates imply that
price elasticities have shifted substantially to the right over the sample period. Furthermore,
the magnitudes of price elasticities in the two periods are quite similar to estimates of price
elasticities from FRAC (Figure 2.3). This is encouraging, as these two models make very
different assumptions about consumer choice (as discussed in the preceding section).























Note: Figure (a) presents the distribution of estimates of ηs, the store-module-level price elasticity. Figure
(b) presents the distribution of store-level averages of these estimates (i.e. averaging across the modules
offered by a store).
2.4.2 Implied Markups
In this section I use the preceding demand estimates to calculate markups which would
be implied under the assumption of monopoly pricing at the store-module level. Although
in general I am hesitant to impose the full structure of a supply side model, assuming a
model of supply side behavior can give us some idea of the magnitude of changes in markups
over my sample period. For simplicity, I treat firms as pricing monopolistically at the store-
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module level, taking into account all cross-effects between products in a module. This is
not meant to represent structural estimates of true markups at the store level. Rather, I
think of this exercise as providing a sense of the potential magnitude of increasing profits
due to the changes in demand which I have documented in this section. Given that we have
already seen that prices have changed little on average in most modules, these estimates
could reasonably be interpreted as one measure of the magnitude of cost reductions over
time.
2.4.2.1 BLP
Under monopolistic pricing, optimal margins satisfy the following equality
p∗ −mc = −J−1p (p∗)s(p∗) (2.10)
where p∗,mc and s are vectors of product-store-week-level prices, marginal costs, and market
shares, and J−1p is the inverse of the Jacobian of store-level market shares with respect to
prices. Because prices are known and the demand function has been estimated, this equation
implies estimates of marginal costs for each product in every store. Implied markups ( p
mc
)
can then be calculated from those marginal costs. I use my estimates from BLP-style models
to construct these estimated markups separately for each product module in each year, and
present them first in Figure 2.5. In this figure I plot the distribution of implied markups from
the 25th to the 75th percentile in 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (red, dashed). I focus on this
small range of the distribution because many points outside of this range are either negative
or so large in absolute value as to be uninformative in either direction. This is one reason
why these estimates should not be taken as estimates of true retailer markups. Still, within
the interquartile range Figure 2.5 indicates significant growth in implied markups over the
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decade. At the median, implied markups have increased from 1.95 to 2.36 (see columns 2
and 4 of Table 2.1), an increase of 20%. At the 95th percentile implied markups have nearly
doubled from 4.62 to 8.31.
It is also worth comparing these results to estimates in De Loecker, Eeckhout and
Unger (2020), who present estimates of markups from Compustat, which covers publicly
traded retail firms, and from the Census of Retail which contains the universe of retail firms.
The retail industry they study is much broader than the retail food industry herein, and their
methods and data differ substantially, as they do not observed product-level prices or sales.
Although their Compustat estimates indicate very small increases in markups of the past
40 years, their estimates from the Census indicate a sharp increase in markups at the mean
from slightly above 2 to slightly above 3 between 2002 and 2012 alone (Figure 12(c) therein).
Further, these estimates imply that at the 95th percentile markups have rise from between 3
and 4 to nearly 7. Clearly, my estimates tend to agree more with the Census estimates. The
most notable difference, which is a key point of this chapter, is that all of the changes in
implied markups I estimate are the result of within-firm (and in fact within-establishment)
changes in variety and consumer preferences, and do not require any changes in competitive
behavior or market power (in the traditional sense). Thus, although my estimates match this
set of estimates by De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020) reasonably well, they provide
an alternative explanation with very different policy implications.
As was the case with the demand estimates in the preceding section, these results are
not being driven by a small subset of modules. To demonstrate this, for each module I divide
implied markups into 100 equally sized bins in each year, take the average of all markups
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within each bin, and plot these binned averages in 2017 against the same bin in 2006.17
Again I focus only on the interquartile range of each distribution. These plots are essentially
quantile-quantile plots, meaning that if the distribution of implied markups were unchanged
over this decade, I would find that all points lie along the plotted 45-degree line. If parts of
the markup distribution have shifted to the right over time, these points should be above the
45-degree line. Figure 2.6 tells a clear story. In all but the Ice Cream category, estimated
markups are substantially larger in 2017 than in 2006 along nearly the entire interquartile
range.
2.4.2.2 FRAC
Next, following the discussion in the previous section, we can convert FRAC demand
estimates into estimates of markups under the same assumption, that each store prices
monopolistically each week within a module. Again, these markup estimates give us a
ballpark figure to understand how a perfectly optimizing monopolist might have benefitted
from the changes in demand documented in preceding sections. In Figure 2.7 I plot the
interquartile range of monopolists’ markups across all products, stores, and weeks in my
sample according to FRAC demand estimates. Just as in Figure 2.5, the distribution of
implied markups has shifted significantly to the right in 2017 relative to 2006. Consistent
with my finding that the distribution of price elasticities estimated by FRAC has a longer
left tail than that of BLP estimates, the distribution of markups is somewhat wider in both
years. As a result, some of the apparent markup growth here appears to come from the right
17This is similar to the results of the “qqplot” command in Stata, which plots quantiles of two distributions
against each other. I focus on the mean in these equally sized bins because quantiles are often much more
sensitive to small variations in the data.
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1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Markup (BLP)
2006 2017
Note: BLP estimates of implied markups across all nine modules in the first 16 weeks of 2006 and 2017.
Only the interquartile range is shown here.
tail of the distribution. Still, the general magnitude of implied markups are quite similar
between the two Figures (2.5 and 2.7).
In Figure 2.8 I again plot quantiles of the implied markup distribution in 2006 and
in 2017 as well as the 45-degree line. Just as is the case in my BLP results, I find that
in the majority of categories the markup distribution has shifted noticeably to the right.
The shape of these shifts differ by category, but the majority of modules demonstrate a
significant shift particularly in the right tail of the distribution. Before moving on, we can
note a few key differences. First, unlike in my BLP estimates, FRAC-implied markups in the
Ice Cream category have increased over time, meaning that all modules see an increase at
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1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
2006
(g) Yogurt (h) Remaining Fruit (i) Light Beer
Note: I calculate 100 equally sized bins of markups in each year, and calculate the mean within each bin.
This figure plots the 2017 mean in a given bin (quantile) against the 2006 mean from the same bin, along
the interquartile range for each module. The red line denotes the 45 degree line.
the median. However, at the bottom of the interquartile range, implied markups in Yogurt
(g) are smaller in 2017 than in 2006, and in Pizza (d) the two distributions are quite similar
across the entire range. Still, altogether, we see a general increase in implied markups across
the vast majority of quantiles in most modules.
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1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Markup (FRAC)
2006 2017
Note: FRAC estimates of markups across all nine modules in the first 16 weeks of 2006 and 2017. Top and
bottom 25% of each distribution have been trimmed.
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1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
2006
(g) Yogurt (h) Remaining Fruit (i) Light Beer
Note: I calculate 100 equally sized bins of markups implied by my FRAC estimates in each year, and calculate
the mean within each bin. This figure plots the 2017 mean in a given bin (quantile) against the 2006 mean
from the same bin, along the interquartile range for each module. The red line denotes the 45 degree line.
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2.4.2.3 Constant Elasticity
Under the constant elasticity specification of demand, optimal pricing follows a very
simple rule. Assuming that firms price each good entirely independently, optimal markups







Thus, we can plug estimates of ηs (store-level price elasticities) into this equation to derive
markups implied by this pricing assumption. In Figure 2.9(a) I present the distributions of
these implied markups in each year, trimming the top and bottom 10% of each distribution.
Note that, unlike in the preceding estimates, in this case optimal markups are calculated
not for each product separately, but rather at the store-module level, because the estimated
model assumes that price elasticities for different products in a module-store-year are iden-
tical. Further, these estimates are solely regarding optimal implied markups, and do not
provide any information as to whether firms are actually charging higher markups. Preced-
ing estimates, to the contrary, represented estimates of markups implied by observed prices
under an optimal pricing rule.
The findings in Figure 2.9(a) may appear to be ambiguous, as many estimates in
both years are negative. That is, the distribution in 2017 includes a longer right tail than
in 2006, but also a longer left tail. This is to be expected, given the significant fraction
of price elasticities which are less than 1 in Figure 2.4. To remove some of the impact of
these categories, I also calculate the store-level median of markup estimates (i.e. across
modules) in each year, and plot these distributions in Figure 2.9(b), again trimming the top
and bottom 10% of estimates. This figure presents a story much more clearly consistent with
59
the demand results, that optimal markups have increased across the vast majority of stores.

























Note: Figure (a) presents the distribution of all plug-in estimates of optimal markups from the constant
elasticity demand model (across all stores and modules), and Figure (b) presents the distribution of store-
level medians (across modules) of these estimates. The top and bottom 10% of each distribution are omitted.
2.5 Extensions and Robustness
2.5.1 Panel of Yogurt Data
One natural concern which may remain after the preceding results is whether the
years I study are anomalous in some way. It could be the case that macroeconomic shocks,
which might affect either consumers’ willingness to pay or the prices and products offered in
stores, could bias my results on one or both years even if there is no broad trend of declining
price sensitivity among consumers. In this section I restrict my focus to Refrigerated Yogurt,
in order to demonstrate that the results in the rest of the chapter appear to represent gradual
changes over time. As a separate, more minor, issue one may also worry that although I use
deflated 2017 (i.e. real) prices throughout the chapter, nominal prices are more relevant for
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demand estimation. This will also be addressed herein.
Including data from intermediate years will shed light on these concerns. For the
results in this section, I use data from the first 6 weeks of 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, and
2017. I begin by estimating a single logit model in each year, under four specifications: (1)
all stores, and no controls, (2) only stores which are present in all years of the panel, (3)
the same restricted sample, plus store-UPC and store-week fixed effects, and (4) the same
as (3) but using nominal prices only. I plot the estimates of the coefficient on price over this
panel in Figure 2.10. Standard errors (clustered at the store-year level) on these estimates
are also included in the graph, though they are generally small enough to be hidden by the
marker. Each of these estimates indicates a trend in the price coefficient over time. Adding
fixed effects naturally changes the price coefficient significantly, but restricting to a balanced
panel of stores and using nominal prices has minimal impact.
Next, I estimate a logit model for every store in every year with more than 250
observations in a given year (most stores with fewer observations are dropped anyway when
absorbing fixed effects). I include UPC and week fixed effects in every regression. Unlike
in the main results, I do not restrict these estimates to stores which generate a balanced
panel. This amounts to nearly 60,000 separate logit estimates in total over the panel, from
which I present two results. First, in Figure 2.11 I plot the mean, 25th, and 75th percentiles
of the distribution of own-price elasticities for each year of the panel. Although the trend
here is not perfect (e.g. the decline between 2010 and 2013), the hypothesis that either of
the end years is anomalous seems unlikely. The mean in 2008 is substantially higher than
that in 2006, the mean in 2010 is higher still, and the mean in 2017 is the most positive of
the sample. Given potentially many changes in this sample, e.g. the rise of greek yogurt
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and the complicated price responses which may have occurred, this figure is strong evidence
of a trend. Second, in Figure 2.12 I plot the same moments of the distribution of estimated
utility coefficients on price over time. Here the trend is even more clear. Except for the
slight decline at the mean in 2013, the average estimated coefficient has increased steadily
over time.




















Note: Estimated coefficients on price from four simple logit models: (circle) all stores in each year, and no
controls, (square) only stores which are present in all years of the panel, (plus) the same restricted sample,
plus store-UPC and store-week fixed effects, and (diamond) the same as (plus) but using nominal prices
only.
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2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
Mean 25-75 Pctile
Note: Mean and interquartile range of own-price elasticities for refrigerated yogurt for selected years between
2006 and 2017.
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2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
Mean 25-75 Pctile
Note: Mean and interquartile range of estimated price coefficients in store-level logit model.
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2.5.2 Additional Categories
Another concern one may have in interpreting the results in this chapter is that I have
selected a relatively small number of categories to study. This is largely due to computational
concerns, as estimating structural models of demand can be time consuming and can require
significant amounts of memory. The categories I study are also the result of a selection
procedure which is imperfect, in the sense that there are many forms of dynamic behavior
on the part of consumers which are not necessarily accounted for by the regressions I estimate.
In light of these concerns, I have chosen an arbitrary set of five additional categories to study:
eggs, sodas, diet sodas, sliced lunchmeat, and baby milk.
For each of these categories, I estimate a simple logit model of consumer demand
which assumes that consumer utility functions take the following form:
uijsw = αspjsw + ξjsw + εijsw (2.12)
ξjsw = ξjs + ξw + ∆ξjsw (2.13)
This is very similar to the empirical model estimated via BLP and FRAC above, with the
key difference being that preferences for price αs is allowed to differ at each store but is
assumed to be constant across individuals. This modification makes the model estimable
via a linear regression in each category and store, thereby making demand estimation much
simpler for these extra categories. I present my results of these demand estimates in Figure
2.13 in the form of estimated densities of own-price elasticities. As predicted, we can see
similar patterns here as in my original nine product modules. In all categories in Figure 2.13,
own-price elasticities have moved substantially toward zero. This is particularly pronounced
in the baby milk and sliced lunchmeat categories.
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Note: Distribution of estimated own-price elasticities in 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (red, dashed). Estimates
come from store-level logit models estimated separately for each module in each year.
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2.5.3 Sales Targeting Behavior Over Time
A final concern is that consumer behavior has become more or less forward-looking
over time. In particular, one may worry that consumers have become less likely to store
substantial inventories of goods and to purchase only when their preferred good is on sale. For
the same reason which motivates the procedure used to select product categories described
in Appendix A, this would bias estimates of price elasticities in 2006 away from zero if
the procedure used to select products was unsuccessful at excluding categories in which
consumers exhibit this behavior. This is difficult to measure in the scanner or HomeScan
data available, because consumers’ inventories are unobservable. However, we might expect
that if sale-targeting behavior had declined over time that we might also see that consumers
search for sales less frequently over time on search engines such as Google. To explore this, in
Figure 2.14 I plot Google Trends results for the keywords “sale,” “coupon,” and “discount”
from 2006 to 2017. This figure demonstrates that searches for “sale” and “coupon”, the
more popular two terms, have increased significantly over time. This evidence is imperfect,
but it is suggestive of increasing sales-targeting behavior over my sample period, rather than
decreasing. This type of behavior would bias my results in 2017 away from zero, thereby
reducing the magnitude of the trends I observe. I therefore take this as suggestive evidence
against the role of dynamic behavior in explaining the results in this chapter.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that, for many popular goods in food stores and mass
merchandisers, consumers have become significantly less price sensitive over the past decade.
I offer one explanation for this trend, that retailers have changed the assortment of products
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Note: Google Trends results for the keywords “sale”, “coupon,” and “discount” over my sample period. All
lines scaled by Google such that 100 is the largest volume among any of the three terms over the depicted
time period.
they offer in order to sustain larger markups. This finding relates to a growing literature
which finds that profit rates, and markups in particular, have risen among many firms in
the United States in recent decades (De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger, 2020). What is
perhaps most novel here is that the explanation I offer is entirely within firm. That is, even
in the absence of changes in market or monopsony power, retailers may have been able to
sustain large markups because the types of technological advances they have experienced
have allowed them to offer more differentiated goods. Moreover, markups induced by this
mechanism can in principle be welfare enhancing. Prices have moved little while consumers
have become able to find products for which they have a high willingness to pay, meaning
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both producer and consumer surplus may have risen.
The evidence I present here demonstrates that own- and cross-price elasticities have
declined significantly between 2006 and 2017 in nine large categories. These results are
robust across nine product modules, which cover thousands of products sold in 5,000-10,000
stores (differing by module) across the country. In models with geographically heterogeneous
preferences I show that the disutility of price has declined significantly in many markets,
meaning that the observed changes in substitution patterns are in part due to changing
preferences. The results also hold when I estimate more than 100,000 store-level constant
elasticity demand curves, which make strong assumptions about cross-product substitution
but which are robust to misspecification of market sizes. Finally, I also find that my results




Decomposing Changes in Consumer Substitution
Patterns
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter focuses on the measurement of differentiation and the ways
in which changes in consumers’ willingness to substitute between goods in retail food stores
may have been used by retail firms to sustain larger profit margins over time. In this chapter,
I estimate additional models of consumer demand in order to develop an understanding of
the structural reasons for changing substitution patterns. The data I use here are the same
as were used in Chapters 1 and 2.
There are two main competing stories which this section will help to rule out. The
first addresses the underlying reasons for declining consumer sensitivity to price. Although
much of the preceding chapters focus on niche goods as driving these trends, it is also possible
that consumers have become less price sensitive due to rising wealth relative to retail food
prices. The results in Chapter 2, which normalize the level of horizontal differentiation in
estimation, cannot distinguish between this story and one in which products have become
more niche on average over time. In this chapter I demonstrate that an additional assumption
restricting the extent to which the perceived quality of goods has changed over time allows
us to distinguish between these two potential underlying causes. Under this additional
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assumption, I find that horizontal differentiation has changed significantly over time and
that demographic changes such as rising wealth play a much smaller role. In Section 3.2.3
I use estimates from this model to demonstrate that vertical differentiation also appears to
play at most a small role in explaining changing preferences over time.
The second story relates to the potential reasons for this finding. Even if consumers
behave as if products are on average more niche, it is possible that this is due to causes other
than changes in the characteristics of new goods. For example, it could be that advertising
has become significantly better at generating strong preferences among targeted consumers.
In practice, this could increase the variance of preferences for goods if advertising for one
brand makes consumers dislike other brands. If this is the case, then consumers might
have become less willing to substitute between goods simply because their perception of
goods has changed over time, rather than because newer goods have different attributes
than older goods. To investigate this possibility, I estimate another model which allows
consumer preferences to differ between newer and older goods. In particular, I introduce an
additional scaling parameter which allows the importance of idiosyncratic, consumer-specific,
preferences to be larger or smaller for newer relative to older goods. My findings indicate
that idiosyncratic preferences play a substantially larger role in determining demand for
newer goods on average, indicating that these goods are indeed more likely to be niche.
3.2 Testing Model Predictions Against Alternatives
Thus far, I have documented substantial changes in consumers’ willingness to sub-
stitute between products. These changes, by definition, imply that perceived differentiation
has increased. Still, in the simple model I presented I argued that the most natural way
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for differentiation to have changed over time was through the changes in the variance of
preferences for horizontal attributes of goods, which is in part due to the introduction of
more niche goods. This section aims to discuss the strength of the evidence for these claims
in particular.
3.2.1 Nicheness vs. Price Sensitivity
As discussed in Section 2.3, in estimation I normalize the variance of horizontal pref-
erences (σ) because this variance is not separately identified from the disutility of price
without additional structure. Thus, the results in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2, which present the
changes in the estimated disutility of price, confound the two. It is therefore possible that
the results thus far represent a change in demographics, such as wealth, which have caused
consumers’ price sensitivities to decline absent any change in preference heterogeneity. It
is also possible that newer products are more vertically differentiated (e.g. higher quality),
which to this point I have generally left unmentioned. To explore the roles each of these
mechanisms may have played, and to isolate the contribution of preference heterogeneity to
the observed trends, consider the following logit model, where utility takes the form:
uijsw =
{













Note that I do not include store-week fixed effects here, as these would make the
interpretation of product fixed effects ξ̄js more complicated. Though I omit this notation,
I allow α and σ to vary not only across years, but also at every store. Otherwise, my
notation here is largely the same as in Section 2.2, except that I make explicit that both
the coefficient on price in the utility function and the variance of ε have changed over time.
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Note that I assume, to the contrary, that the fixed effects ξ̄js do not change over time for a
given product. To the extent that ξ̄js represents preferences for fixed, unobserved, product
characteristics, this assumption is relatively weak. Still, these fixed effects may change over
time if, for example, advertising some goods has changed average preferences for those goods
relative to their competitors. To identify the relative importance of these two components



















+ ∆ξjt in 2017
(3.2)
where I emphasize that the effective/estimated fixed effects and price coefficients in each
year are dependent on the variance of ε, just as in Equation 2.1.1 What is important to
see here is that although the change in price coefficients over time represents a combination
of changes in price sensitivities and differentiation, changes in the magnitudes of estimated
fixed effects offer an estimate of the latter alone. Thus, by comparing the magnitudes of
product fixed effects in 2006 and 2017, we can derive an estimate of σ2017
σ2006
, which will allow
us to decompose the changes in demand in the previous section to show to what extent
price elasticities would have changed in the absence of any rising preference heterogeneity.
There are many choices for deriving an estimate of σ2017
σ2006
. Perhaps the most direct route is
to calculate an estimate of σ2006 for each product which is sold in a store in both 2006 and
2017. However, this is sensitive to estimation noise in individual fixed effects, which can be
quite large. Instead, I take the standard deviation of product fixed effects (among products
sold in a store in both years) as an estimate of 1
σy
for each year y, and use the ratio of these
1The residual ∆ξjt is also rescaled, but I omit that notation for brevity.
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quantities as a measure of the ratio of variances of ε.2
From this, we can also derive the extent to which α (the true disutility of price)
changed as well, as:

















Estimated change in price disutility
With estimates of the changes in σ and in α separately, we can now study the importance
of each by estimating price elasticities in 2017 under 2006 levels of horizontal differentiation
and/or price disutility. What this algebra shows is that if we find that estimated fixed effects
and estimated price coefficients have changed by the same multiplicative factor, we should
conclude that most changes in price elasticities are due to rising horizontal differentiation.
To the extent that the two differ, the disutility of price may have also changed over time.
I conduct this exercise by constructing two counterfactual distributions of price elas-







1 − exp(α̂pjt + ξ̂jt)
1 +
∑
j exp(α̂pjt + ξ̂jt)
)
Thus, to calculate the desired counterfactuals I first rescale the mean utility term α2017pjsw+
ξjsw, as well as my estimates of α2017, by
σ2017
σ2006
. This sets the effective variance of ε (i.e.
preference heterogeneity) in each store to its 2006 levels. In a second counterfactual, I also
2I estimate this model using the reghdfe command in Stata (Correia, 2016), to estimate many fixed effects
and many store-level coefficients on price at once.
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rescale α̂2017 by my estimate of
α2006
α2017
, thereby setting both the variance of ε and the disutility
of price to 2006 levels.
In Figure 3.1 I plot the results of this exercise in the form of four distributions.
In black (solid) is the distribution of estimated price elasticities in 2006. The estimated
price elasticities in 2017 are in grey. In red (dashed) is the first counterfactual distribution,
in which I recalculate all price elasticities 2017 after rescaling to set the variance of ε to
2006 levels for each store. The magnitude of the importance of horizontal differentiation is
apparent from this plot. Removing the effects of preference heterogeneity over this decade
shifts the distribution of price elasticities in 2017 much further to the left and much closer
to the estimated distribution in 2006, meaning that explanations for the demand estimates
herein that rely solely on the disutility of price or on changes in the price distribution leave
much of the observed changes unexplained. In Figure B.8 of the Appendix I show that this
result is true to varying degrees in most modules as well. Finally, in green (dot-dashed) I
show the second counterfactual distribution, which calculates price elasticities in 2017 under
2006 levels of both preference heterogeneity and disutility of price. Parts of this distribution
are significantly closer to my estimates in 2006 than even the first counterfactual, meaning
that the disutility of price plays a role in declining price elasticities which is distinct from
the rise of preference heterogeneity.
To make the similarity of the red (counterfactual preference heterogeneity) and black
(2017 estimates) lines more concrete, I also present Table 3.1, in which I display the mean and
selected quantiles of each of the three distributions. The proximity of the counterfactual 2017
distribution to the estimated distribution in 2006 is stark. Although they differ noticeably at
most quantiles, the differences between these two distributions is in all cases smaller than the
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difference between the estimated distributions in 2006 and 2017. In this way, rising preference
heterogeneity appears to have played a significant role in the trends in differentiation shown
above.















Note: In black and grey I show estimates of price elasticities from a logit model with store-specific preferences
in 2006 and 2017 (respectively). In red (dotted) I plot the distribution of 2017 price elasticities under the
counterfactual in which horizontal differentiation in each store were set to its 2006 level, and in green (dot-
dashed) I plot this distribution after also adjusting the disutility of price to 2006 levels.
One concern with Figure 3.1 is that it could, in principle, mask significant hetero-
geneity across products. That is, although the full distribution of counterfactual estimates
is much closer to the 2006 distribution than are the 2017 estimates, it could be that average
price elasticities at the UPC level have moved substantially within this distribution, meaning
that Figure 3.1 overstates the role of preference heterogeneity in my demand estimates. To
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Estimated and Counterfactual Own-Price Elasticities
2017 Counterfactuals 2006 Estimates 2017 Estimates
Mean -2.33 -2.13 -1.7
10% -4.08 -4.00 -3.21
25% -2.73 -2.89 -2.25
Median -1.76 -1.89 -1.47
75% -1.10 -1.16 -.87
90% -.64 -.63 -.50
Note: Mean and selected quantiles of estimated own-price elasticities in 2006 and 2017, and counterfactual
2017 estimates in which store-level preference heterogeneity is set to 2006 levels (dashed, red in Figure 3.1).
Estimates derived by store-level logit models (Equation 3.2).
address this concern, I calculate average price elasticities for each product in each year. I
calculate the change in this average for each product which appears in both years, both for
my estimates and under the desired counterfactual. The distributions of realized and coun-
terfactual differences are plotted in Figure 3.2, where I show that while estimated elasticities
increase by 0.38 at the median, UPC-average counterfactual elasticities increase by only 0.1.
This makes clear that, in fact, returning differentiation to 2006 levels reduces the average
change in product-level price elasticities significantly.
3.2.2 Are New Products More Niche?
The final prediction of the simple model in Section 1.3 in Chapter 1 is that newer
products are likely to be more niche than older products. Although I take the preceding
section as evidence that products are more niche in 2017 than in 2006 on average, it could be
that all products have become more horizontally differentiated over time due to, for example,
effective advertising. This is difficult to test directly, in large part because it’s unclear how
best to define “new” given that only two years (a decade apart) are observed. Given the
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Mean Difference, UPC Average Price Elasticity
Estimates 2006 Heterogeneity
Note: Distributions of average changes (between 2006 and 2017) in own-price elasticities at the product level.
Changes implied by store-level logit estimates are in black (solid), and changes implied by a counterfactual
which sets preference heterogeneity to 2006 levels in each store are in red (dashed).
caveat that any such definition will be coarse, we can however permit consumers to have more
heterogeneous preferences for some products than others. To do this, I estimate a model
identical to that in Section 2.3.1 (Chapter 2) for each module in 2017 with two exceptions.
First, I introduce an additional scaling parameter which rescales the utility (net of the logit
error) for “new” products relative to existing products, such that:
uijsw =
{
αipjsw + ξjsw + εijsw for old products
ρ(αipjsw + ξjsw) + εijsw for new products
(3.3)
78
where I define a product as “old” if it was ever in my sample in 2006 and “new” otherwise.3
Because both new and old products exist in many stores, this is not equivalent to letting
the variance of ε differ explicitly (doing this directly would make estimation much more
complicated), but it is quite similar. For large values of ρ, the importance of the logit error
in determining demand for a new product shrinks relative to the vertical characteristic and
price. For small ρ, the logit error becomes increasingly important, meaning consumers are
less likely to substitute away from that product in response to price increases. Thus, the
hypothesis of the simple model is that ρ < 1. The second deviation from Section 2.3.1 is that
I only include UPC and store fixed effects separately (rather than UPC-store fixed effects).
I do this because I find in practice that including store-UPC fixed effects tends to make the
search procedure behave much more poorly and make the results less robust to changes in
sample size. I am forced by time and computational constraints to draw a random sample
of 1,000 stores for each module and estimate the model using only these samples. Estimates
with this reduced number of fixed effects appear to be robust to drawing alternative samples.
I present the results of this estimation procedure in Table 3.2. I find that in all
modules except for Remaining Fruit the estimated value of ρ is statistically significantly less
than 1, meaning that demand for newer products is more dependent on logit errors (i.e.
preference heterogeneity) than is demand for older products. This is consistent with the
model, which predicted that newer products would be more niche than older products and
thus that consumers would be less sensitive to price changes in the former. The extent to
which these newer products are more niche varies substantially by category. In Light Beer,
3One may wonder why I introduce ρ instead of directly permitting the variance of ε to vary across
products. This is because the standard logit form (which describes the maximum among symmetric logit
draws) fails to hold in this case, making the estimation of such a model significantly more complicated.
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ρ̂ is much smaller than 1, implying that consumers of new light beers are less than half as
sensitive to price changes as consumers of older beers.4
Table 3.2: Estimates of Scaling Parameter for Newer Products
ρ ᾱ σα
Fruit Drinks 0.92 -0.63 1.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Soup 0.92 -0.69 1.23
(0.01) (0) (0.01)
Cookies 0.98 -0.5 1.24
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Pizza 0.93 -0.48 3.63
(0.03) (0.01) (0.21)
Ice Cream 0.67 -0.53 2.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
Entrees 0.72 -0.18 2.34
(0.05) (0.02) (0.28)
Yogurt 0.79 0.08 4.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12)
Remaining Fruit 1.08 -0.36 1.17
(0.04) (0.01) (0.05)
Light Beer 0.34 -0.25 0.45
(0.01) (0) (0.01)
Note: Estimates of utility parameters and rescaling parameter for each module. The parameter ρ is an
estimate of the rescaling parameter which multiplies “new” products, defined as products (i.e. UPCs) which
were not sold in 2006 in my data.
4One concern with these estimates is that σα is very large relative to ᾱ, implying that a large number
of price coefficients are positive. I have also estimated models for some categories in which αi is distributed
as a log normal random variable. Though this model is much more prone to numerical issues, estimates are
similar when both models converge. Estimates from such a model are presented in Table B.3.
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3.2.3 Vertical Differentiation
Finally, one may wonder whether vertical differentiation has played a similarly large
role. If increasingly efficient supply chains have reduced firms’ marginal costs significantly,
some firms may have invested in higher quality goods which were too expensive ex ante. To
address this possibility, I briefly summarize the extent to which the quality of newer goods
differs from that of existing goods in Figure 3.3. In this figure, I plot the distribution of
product fixed effects (which are estimated in the store-level logit regressions above) for new
and old/existing products in 2017. I define “new” slightly differently here. Rather than
specifying a UPC as being “new” depending on whether it was ever sold in 2006, I call a
product “new” if a that product was not sold in a given store in 2006. This definition allows
us to quantify the extent to which newer goods in each store are preferred on average by the
consumers in that store, without constraining average preferences (or the variance of logit
errors) to be identical across stores.
Using this definition, I plot the full distribution of estimated fixed effects for “ex-
isting” (black, solid) and “new” (blue, dashed) products. Unlike in many of the preceding
figures, the differences between the distributions in 2006 and 2017 are generally small. Con-
sistent with Bronnenberg and Ellickson (2015), who comment “the supply and availability of
fresh products and the diversity and quality of products on offer” have improved, I find the
most significant increase in this vertical characteristic to be in the subcategory of fruits in
my sample (subfigure (h)). This also helps make sense of the fact that price elasticities have
declined in this category even while newer products are less niche (according to Table 3.2).
The other most notable differences are in the Soup, Yogurt, and Frozen Pizza categories,
all of which appear to indicate that newer products rank slightly lower on vertical dimen-
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sions than newer. In general, these changes are small, bolstering the notion that horizontal
differentiation has played the dominant role in rising differentiation.
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Note: Plotted are the distributions of product fixed effects in 2017 from the store-level logit model. Estimates
of fixed effects of existing products are in black (solid) and those from new products are in blue (dashed).
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3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I show that the results of Chapter 2 are consistent with the simple
model and motivating evidence introduced in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I used a simple model
to argue that retail food stores have, over time, begun to offer goods which are more narrowly
tailored to subsets of consumers’ tastes. This model predicts that, by 2017, products which
are sold in retail food stores should be more niche on average and in particular that this
should be driven by the fact that newer goods (e.g. goods which were not sold in 2006)
are more niche. This chapter presented the results of two new structural models aimed at
evaluating the evidence for or against these model predictions.
In the first model, I demonstrated that an assumption precluding changes in a prod-
uct’s perceived quality over time is sufficient to estimate changes in both horizontal differ-
entiation and the disutility of price over time. This assumption is novel in the literature,
as most estimates of mixed logit models like those herein must normalize one or the other
of these objects. I use this model to calculate price elasticities in 2017 under two counter-
factuals which set the level of horizontal differentiation and preferences for price to their
2006 levels. The results of this counterfactual exercise demonstrate that setting horizontal
differentiation (preference heterogeneity) to its 2006 levels undoes many of the estimated
differences in price elasticities between the two years in my sample, and that the disutility
of price plays a much smaller role. Later in the chapter I use estimates from this model
to also demonstrate that newer goods (those sold in 2017 but not in 2006) appear to be of
similar perceived quality to older goods (those sold in both years) in all categories except
for Remaining Fruit.
In the second model I introduce a new scaling parameter which allows preferences
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to differ explicitly between newer and older goods. Specifically, this parameter controls
the importance of price and quality in determining demand for newer goods relative to
idiosyncratic preferences. In all categories except for Remaining Fruit I find that consumers
are less sensitive to changes in the price of newer goods than they are when the prices of
older goods change. I take this as evidence that newer goods are indeed more niche, which






As described in the text, in order to exclude any product categories in which con-
sumers exhibit sales targeting behavior, I conduct a test for many product modules which
draws on the arguments in Hendel and Nevo (2006): if consumers are unable to store goods,
then the amount purchased on one trip to the store should not predict the time until the
next trip. The goal here is to test the null hypothesis that consumers are not storing goods,
and to restrict my sample to modules for which I cannot reject the null. As I observe nearly
every trip taken by the households in the Homescan data, we can do so by testing whether
the quantity purchased on a given date predicts the amount of time which passes before a
consumer purchases again. To be precise, I run the following regression separately for 40
modules in 2006:
Time Sinceit = f(pit) + βqit−1 + θh + δj + ηit (A.1)
where Time Since is the number of days since the most recent purchase before trip t by
consumer i in a given module.1 In this regression pit and qit−1 are current price paid and
previous quantity purchased, and θh and δj are household and product fixed effects respec-
1Before running these regressions, I restrict the sample to trips (1) which were the only trip taken by
that household on a given day, and (2) in which the household bought only one product within the module
of interest. These are necessary to make qit−1 well-defined and to make Time Since measurable (as I only
observe the day of any given trip).
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tively.2 The coefficient β is the focus of the test. Household fixed effects are necessary here
because some households may consistently purchase higher quantities. Product fixed effects
control for product size and whether or not the product is a pack of multiple smaller units.
Without these fixed effects, consumers switching between 6- and 12-packs of sodas (for ex-
ample) could bias estimates of β. Finally, I instrument for qit−1 with pit−1, which links the
regression to the thought experiment more directly: if additional units purchased previously
as a result of a sale increase the time until a household purchases again, then consumers
may be storing goods and targeting sales.
Consistent with intuition, the modules selected in this appendix tend to be either
perishable (e.g. Yogurt) and/or not easily stored in large quantities as other modules (e.g.
Frozen Pizza). However, two points should be emphasized. First, the test above is for storage
and sales targeting behavior, not for whether or not a good is perishable. Soup, which is
included in my sample, can be stored for months in a pantry. What this test implies is that
consumers are unlikely to purchase additional units of soup in response to a sale, or to avoid
purchasing by consuming from an inventory at home. Second, although I argue that this
test is one reasonable way to reduce the number of products to be studied, I do not claim
that this is necessarily crucial to my results. Even if consumers maintain inventories, most
of the questions of interest here are about changes in substitution patterns over time. As
long as consumers target sales and store inventories at the same rate in 2006 and 2017, my
conclusions will be unaffected.3 The set of p-values for all modules are in Table A.1.
2I specify f(·) as a cubic function of price.
3Although the story I am most concerned about predicts that β > 0, in practice many estimates are
negative. As this still implies that past purchases predict future behavior (albeit in a more complicated
story), I treat these categories identically to those with β̂ > 0.
87
Table A.1: Results of All Tests for Inventory Behavior
Module Description p-value N
FRUIT- ORANGE- OTHER CONTAINER < 0.001 189210
FRUIT DRINKS - OTHER CONTAINER 0.991 84271
BABY MILK AND MILK FLAVORING 0.217 4223
SOUP-CANNED 0.644 98075
CAT FOOD- WET TYPE 0.015 26209
DOG FOOD - DRY TYPE < 0.001 58268
SNACKS - TORTILLA CHIPS 0.107 107960
CEREAL - READY TO EAT < 0.001 188801
COOKIES 0.993 197003
GROUND AND WHOLE BEAN COFFEE < 0.001 101399
SOFT DRINKS - CARBONATED < 0.001 132651
WATER- BOTTLED 0.110 68437
CANDY- CHOCOLATE 0.015 158994
CANY - NON-CHOCOLATE 0.010 107560
SOFT DRINKS - LOW CALORIE 0.001 119141
ENTREES- ITALIAN-1 FROOD - FROZEN 0.010 44622
PIZZA - FROZEN 0.972 74221
ICE CREAM - BULK 0.675 142015
FROZEN NOVELTIES 0.177 79076
LUNCHMEAT - SLICED-REFRIGERATED 0.164 105761
FRANKFURTERS - REFRIGERATED < 0.001 83761
BACON- REFRIGERATED < 0.001 108521
ENTREES - REFRIGERATED 0.576 43736
CHEESE- SHREDDED < 0.001 100283
YOGURT - REFRIGERATED 0.808 92011
LUNCHMEAT - DELI POUCHES - REFRIGERATED 0.045 53413
DAIRY-MILK-REFRIGERATED 0.002 764194
BAKERY-CAKES-FRESH 0.056 82168
EGGS-FRESH < 0.001 365468
FRESH FRUIT - REMAINING 0.515 63883
BEER 0.052 15945
LIGHT BEER (LOW CALORIE/ALCOHOL) 0.742 13344
DETERGENTS -HEAVY DUTY- LIQUID < 0.001 97923
BLEACH-LIQUID/GEL 0.005 32798
TOILET TISSUE < 0.001 184531
PAPER TOWELS < 0.001 126729
BATTERIES < 0.001 56657
ANTACIDS < 0.001 22113
PAIN REMEDIES - HEADACHE < 0.001 52689
COLD REMEDIES - ADULT < 0.001 33085
DISPOSABLE DIAPERS < 0.001 18024
Note: Reported are p-values and sample sizes in estimating Equation A.1 for each module. Categories
chosen by the author from Table 2b of the Online Appendix of DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019), which
lists many of the highest revenue products in the Nielsen data. The categories I include here were chosen
generally to give preference to the highest revenue modules.
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Appendix B
Omitted Figures and Tables
Table B.1: Changing Brand Structure and Characteristics
2006 2017
Flavored Products 239885 188499
Unique Flavors 14378 29744
Organic 3518 16311
Note: Constructed from products files provided by Nielsen. Flavors are defined by Nielsen’s unique flavor
codes, and products are counted as “organic” if they are marked as having a USDA seal indicating the
product is organic.
Table B.2: Estimated Price Elasticities by Year, Constant Elasticity
2006 2017
Estimates Post-Shrinkage Estimates Post-Shrinkage
Mean -1.87 -1.94 -1.54 -1.56
5% -3.99 -3.74 -3.11 -3.02
25% -2.74 -2.66 -2.05 -1.99
Median -1.97 -1.97 -1.49 -1.48
75% -0.92 -1.15 -0.93 -1.03
95% 0.24 -0.12 -0.22 -0.42
Note: Distribution of estimated and post-shrinkage (empirical Bayes) estimates of price elasticities in 2006
and 2017, estimated in the constant elasticity model.
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Note: Estimated own-price elasticities in 2006 and 2017 for the Light Beer module. Estimates are from a
nested logit model estimated separately in each year with UPC and week fixed effects.
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Note: Estimated average cross-price elasticities in 2006 and 2017 for the Light Beer module. Estimates are
from a nested logit model estimated separately in each year with UPC and week fixed effects.
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Note: Plotted are the distributions (across stores) of the number of products in my sample sold in the first
week of 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (blue, dashed).
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Note: Plotted are the distributions (across UPCs) of average own-price elasticities in 2006 (black, solid) and
2017 (blue, dashed).
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Note: Plotted are the distributions of markups in 2006 (black, solid) and 2017 (blue, dashed) according to
BLP estimates, conditioning on estimates with positive implied marginal costs and trimming the top and
bottom five percent of the distributions.
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Note: Plotted are the full distributions (across UPCs) of average own-price elasticities in 2006 (black, solid)
and 2017 (blue, dashed).
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Note: Plotted are the distributions (across stores) of estimated price elasticities in the constant elasticity
demand model. Estimates from 2006 are in black (solid) and those from 2017 are in blue (dashed).
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Note: Distributions of estimated own-price elasticities in 2006 (black) and 2017 (grey), as well as counterfac-
tual price elasticities which set preference heterogeneity to 2006 levels (red, dashed). Estimates come from
logit models estimated at the store-module-year level.
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Note: Estimates of scaling parameter ρ from Equation 3.3, with αi distributed according to a log normal
distribution which is constrained to be negative. Modules with asterisks were estimated using 200 randomly
sampled stores; otherwise, 400 stores were used. The estimation procedures for Fruit Drinks and Yogurt do
not converge and often yield numerical issues.
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